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REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH DISCRIMINATORY TAXES:
A CONTRACTARIAN EXPLANATION OF
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
Erin A. O'Hara and William R. Dougan*
INTRODUCTION
Legislatures tax to raise revenues, but often a tax treats American
citizens disparately. Discriminatory taxes have the effect and presumed
purpose of redistributing wealth and are subject to constitutional challenge
in our courts. When the tax in question redistributes uniformly from
wealthy to poor individuals (i.e., progressive taxation), the courts have
almost never been sympathetic to constitutional challenges based on state
or federal takings, equal protection, due process, or uniform taxation
clauses. Yet, when taxes redistribute in other ways, courts have used each
of these clauses, as well as others, to scrutinize, and occasionally invali-
date, the legislation.
Although several academics have posited normative arguments
concerning various forms of discriminatory taxation,' little attention has
focused on developing a positive theory of the constitutional treatment of
federal, state, and local taxes that fall disproportionately on a minority of
citizens. As a notable example, Richard Epstein recently took a strong
normative stand against the constitutionality of progressive taxation, as
well as other forms of redistribution, in his book Takings.2 Shortly thereaf-
. Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law, and Professor, Department of
Economics, Clemson University, respectively. Special thanks for helpful discussions with Martin
Bailey, Yoram Barzel, David Gordon, Claire Hill, Bruce Johnsen, Leandra Lederman, Richard Murphy,
Warren Schwartz, James Snyder, and Maxwell Steams. Thanks also to workshop participants at
Clemson University, Department of Economics and George Mason University School of Law, and to
Carol Gosain and Allen Dudley, Jr. for valuable research assistance. Professor O'Hara received
generous research support for this article from the Law and Economics Center, George Mason Uni-
versity.
See, e.g., WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION (1953); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING wrrH THE STATE 127-44 (1993) (interstate
commerce); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS]; CHARLES 0. GAL-
VIN & BORIS I. BrrKER, THE INcoME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD IT BE? (1969); Daniel
Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 895 (1992)
(discrimination against interstate commerce).
2 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 1. In Takings, Epstein advocates interpreting the Takings Clause
to prohibit government programs that fail to increase the total wealth of society. See id. at 283-305.
Additionally, and ideally, government programs should preserve the relative entitlements among
citizens. See id. Epstein's position is based on a natural rights theory of entitlement to liberty and
property. See id. Progressive taxation contradicts both of these norms because it is likely to enhance
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ter, however, he modified his position reluctantly to embrace progressive
taxation, resigning himself, without persuasive reason, to what he viewed
as the depressing factual inevitability of a welfare state.3 This raises an
interesting question that has not yet been satisfactorily answered: on what
basis do American courts distinguish permissible from impermissible
redistributive legislative bargains?
To better illustrate the problem, consider the following puzzles raised
with the constitutional treatment of discriminatory taxation. First, suppose
that one citizen, Sam, earns $150,000 each year and another citizen, Joe,
earns $25,000. As we all know, Sam is typically assessed a higher margin-
al tax rate on his income than Joe must pay on his own income. Under
present Supreme Court doctrine, this progressive taxation is constitutionally
permissible. At the same time, if the government confiscates Sam's real
property through taxation, the uncompensated "taking" is impermissible.5
What accounts for the distinction, given that both taxes have the effect of
discriminating against Sam in favor of other persons? Second, if the
legislature separates out one professional class, say bankers, for special
taxation, the tax is upheld as "nonarbitrary." If instead banker Sam, in his
capacity as a homeowner, is assessed a higher tax rate on his real property
than the rate assessed on his neighbor, Sue, then the discriminatory tax
Sam suffers is struck down as "arbitrary" and therefore unconstitutional.6
What distinguishes these discriminatory taxes? Third, even though a county
tax assessor cannot force Sam to pay higher property tax rates than his
neighbors must pay, California's Proposition 13, which creates similarly
disparate taxes, has been upheld as constitutional.7 Again, why are these
differential tax rates treated differently? Finally, the Supreme Court has
upheld state taxes imposed on chain retailers that are assessed according to
the number of stores in the chain.' These chain store taxes are intended to
a mismatch of taxes and benefits from government programs. See id. at 295-305. Epstein also notes
that there is no real cost to reading a flat tax requirement into the Takings Clause. See id. at 299-300.
3 See Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. C. L. REv. 41,
87-89 (1992). In his article, Epstein offers a compromise designed for liberals and conservatives: the
state can redistribute as much as it likes from rich to poor so long as it does so through general
revenue taxes. See id. at 87-88. The only justification Epstein accepts for equalizing redistribution,
however, is the "common perception" that a dollar of income is worth more to a poor person than a
rich one. Id. at 87. We offer a positive explanation of the inevitability of some equalizing redistribution
that does not center on problematic, indeed impossible, interpersonal utility comparisons. On
interpersonal utility comparisons, see HERBERT KIESLING, TAXATION AND PUBLIC GOODS 298 (1992);
ABBA P. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL ch. 5 (1944).
' We defer a discussion of the specific cases that illustrate the courts' treatment of the following
problems to Part II infra.
' See Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898).
6 See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
See, e.g., State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931).
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protect small local retailers from the competitive effects of large national
firms. During the same period, however, one state imposed a progressive
sales tax on gross receipts on the very same retailers motivated by the very
same reasons, and the gross sales tax was struck down.9 Why was the per
store tax permissible but the gross sales tax problematic? A satisfactory
theory of discriminatory taxation should be able to explain each of these
constitutional distinctions.
We attempt to make headway toward a positive theory of discrimina-
tory taxes by showing that the results derived from a simple social
contractarian model of constitutions help to explain the courts' distinctions.
Consistent with social contract theory, we view government as emerging
from the consent of those to be governed by it.10 If a constitution is
properly viewed as a document reflecting a consensus among citizens
regarding the best rules for society, then we expect that constitution to
include, at a minimum, those rules that would receive unanimous support
ex ante. In contrast to other contractarian models, however, we do not
attempt to specify the precise rules by which people will choose to be
governed over an indefinite period of time. We ask, instead, whether any
rules or procedures are likely to be excluded by the social contract. In
short, our view of constitutions is that they are proscriptive rather than pre-
scriptive.
The key difference between our positive approach and the well-known
normative contractarian analyses of wealth redistribution is that we relax
the assumption of Rawlsian ignorance. In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls
proposed that the social contract should include those redistributive rules
that society would agree to if its members were positioned behind a veil of
ignorance." Rawls concludes that if individuals do not know their posi-
tion in society or which generation they will be born into, they will agree
to provide a safety net for the less fortunate. All would agree to use
taxation to "preserve an approximate justice in distributive shares"'2 and
to "prevent concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of politi-
cal liberty and fair equality of opportunity."' 3
See Valentine v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 299 U.S. 32 (1936) (per curiam).
Contractarian approaches vary beyond this very basic commonality. See, e.g., DAVID
GAUT1-ER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Penguin Books 1968);
GREGORY S. KAVKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITCAL THEORY (1986); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JuSTicE (1971). For discussions of several recent contractarian theories of jurisprudence, see JODY
S. KRAus, THE LiMITs OF HOBBESiAN CONTRACTARIANISM (1993); CHANDRAN KUKATHAS & PHILIP
PErrr, RAWLS: "A THEORY OF JUSTICE" AND ITS CRITICS 17-35 (1990).
See RAWLS, supra note 10, at 136-38.
,2 Id. at 277.
3 Id. Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan use assumptions of Rawlsian ignorance and risk
aversion to come to quite different normative conclusions. See generally GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES
M. BuCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAx (1980). Given that (1) individuals are ignorant about their future
1998]
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We believe that a satisfactory positive theory of constitutions must
acknowledge that the rules agreed upon or subsequently modified will be
shaped by self-interested individuals who at least attempt to predict the
effect of those rules on their future social and wealth positions. Despite
whatever ethical merits Rawls' normative theory may have, it does not
attempt to predict or explain the outcomes of actual constitution-stage
bargains. Our assumption is as stark as Rawls', but its exact opposite. We
assume that in matters of taxation, individuals usually can accurately pre-
dict how proposed constitutional rules will affect them personally, and will
be reluctant to agree to any rule that is likely to leave them worse off.
Moreover, unlike normative contractarian theories that address the issue of
the legitimacy of political institutions, we merely attempt to explain why
most, but not all, redistributions of wealth would be constitutionally
permissible. 4 We do not argue that the present redistribution of wealth in
the United States-or anywhere else-is either desirable or defensible.
Instead, we conclude only that it is the predictable consequence of the
common desire of all members of society to improve the condition of
themselves and their families.
In Part I, we briefly present a decision tree to motivate the theoretic
discussion that follows. The tree represents the major decisions faced by
citizens deciding whether to form or modify a government. In Part II, we
argue that in a democratic society, wealth redistribution from rich to poor
will not likely be precluded, although limits on the degree of redistribution
might garner widespread support. Our simple social contractarian model
also enables us to characterize the general conditions under which progres-
sive taxes would likely be constitutionally prohibited."
Democratic redistribution that does not tend systematically toward
wealth equalization is more complex, and thus it is more difficult for each
citizen to predict its consequences. A polity in which any temporary
majority can differentially tax the corresponding minority today is one in
which the tables may easily be turned tomorrow. The most that can be pre-
dicted in a society with such unstable coalitions is a condition of continued
uncertainty in which each citizen must be ever-vigilant and politically
positions regarding tax burdens and government benefits, and (2) the government, like other institu-
tions, acts as a revenue maximizer, then rational individuals would seek to constrain exploitation by the
government to the maximum possible extent. See id. at 1-49. The authors propose several constitutional
provisions designed to hinder government revenue-raising abilities, including rate caps and prohibitions
against discriminatory taxation. See id. at 187-205.
4 For a discussion of the distinction between normative and coniractarian theories, see KRAUS.
supra note 10, at 2-3.
'" We express no opinion on the wisdom of redistributive taxation; we attempt only to explain the
pattern of its incidence. There is a vast literature treating progressive taxation from a normative
perspective. See, e.g., BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 1; GALVIN & BrrrKER, supra note 1; EDwIN R.A.
SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION ch. 10 (1931).
[Vol. 6:4
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active to protect his or her wealth. This unstable political environment is
undesirable to everyone (with the possible exception of lobbyists), because
these taxes impose "symmetric" burdens on citizens, where no one expects
to systematically gain over time, although everyone bears the political
costs associated with protecting his wealth. Consequently, unrestricted,
symmetric, non-equalizing taxation invariably would be proscribed consti-
tutionally.
There is a third possible category of taxes, however, comprising those
that neither tend toward systematic wealth equalization nor are equally
likely to burden any arbitrary or fleeting majority. As we explain in Part
ll.B, taxes that generate support from stable conditions will likely system-
atically benefit some individuals, and are therefore unlikely to be constitu-
tionally proscribed. These latter taxes are more likely to be upheld by the
courts than are the class of symmetric, non-equalizing taxes.
Virtually all taxes alter the consumption and production choices made
by households and firms and are therefore inefficient. The costs of coali-
tion formation in democratic governments, including but not limited to
lobbying efforts, are an additional source of economic loss or social cost.
But the American courts have not chosen to defend absolute efficiency. In
Part III, we conclude that the courts instead take a minimalist approach to
legislative bargains and strike down only those discriminatory taxes that al-
most certainly would be proscribed if considered explicitly at the constitu-
tion stage. In fact, given the costs of monitoring legislative attempts at
wealth redistribution, the courts have difficulty taking even this minimalist
constitutional approach. In Part IV, we posit that, instead of striking down
redistributive taxes, the courts uphold these wealth transfers while working
to reduce their social costs. In this sense, the courts may protect relative
rather than absolute efficiency.
I. CONSTITUTION-FORMING CHOICES
Ultimately, we hope to explain why courts invalidate some discrimi-
natory taxes while leaving the bulk of tax decisions to the legislature. Our
theory requires the reader to temporarily suspend reality in order to con-
sider the social contract that citizens might choose if each were asked to
state her preferences. Of course, contractarian bargains are hypothetical
rather than real. Nevertheless, when courts consider constitutional challeng-
es to legislation, one important, perhaps overriding, consideration is the
sentiment of the people. If the constitution does not specifically prohibit
the legislation in question, a court must determine whether the citizens
would have prohibited the legislation if they had thought about the issue at
the time the constitution was formed. We postulate that judges' rough
guesses about the social contract inform their constitutional decisions.
19981
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Let us first consider the most general constitutional decisions, in order
to set the stage for the more specific discriminatory tax issues we turn to
later. When a society considers whether to create or alter a constitutional
agreement, the citizens must first determine whether they desire any social
contract at all. What forces might motivate them to bargain over a consti-
tution, and what provisions will such an agreement contain? The answers
to these questions have many important political, ethical and economic
dimensions. We focus solely on one aspect of their deliberations: the level
of wealth each member of the society expects to attain under the particular
constitution that is chosen. We model the choice of a constitution as a
solution to a cooperative bargaining game which requires unanimous
agreement by all citizens for its adoption.
Figure 1 offers a decision tree representing the citizens' fundamental
social contract choices. We define a social contract as an agreement among
self-interested individuals governing the rules by which their behavior shall
be constrained. Anarchy, then, is a situation in which the citizens have
failed to agree to any social contract. It therefore provides a reference point
against which to measure the gains from any particular social contract. In
the language of bargaining theory, anarchy is the "no agreement" point in
the set of feasible allocations of wealth. We assume no person would agree
to a social contract under which he expects to be worse off than he would
be in anarchy.
Node 1
No Cooperation Simple Majority Restricted Government
i (Anarchy) I Rule (MR) (NTSC)L
Neditiuve 2oiceVRedistributive Policies
Equalizing Transfers Non-equalizing Transfers
IFNod, 37
[Symmetric Expectations Asymmetric Expectations
of Outcomes of Outcomes
FIGURE 1
[Vol. 6:4
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In a state of anarchy, property claims must be actively defended by
each claimant against would-be predators. Any person can choose to
allocate time and other resources to creating new wealth, seizing existing
wealth from others, or defending existing wealth from seizure by others. 6
In comparison to a system in which property rights are secured under the
rule of law, anarchy can give rise to extensive economic inefficiency. The
time and material resources devoted to seizing and defending previously
created wealth is wasted from the point of view of society as a whole,
since those resources could have been used to create new wealth rather
than to reallocate existing wealth. A social contract that reduces the level
and the cost of such redistributive activity increases society's total wealth.
Social contracts regarding property rights in wealth can take many
forms. We consider two extreme contracts: (1) simple or pure majority rule
(MR), in which any wealth redistribution package approved by the majori-
ty is valid; and (2) restricted government, in which everyone has an
inviolable property right to his own wealth. Under a restricted government,
by definition, all majority rule wealth redistributions are proscribed.
Because forced transfers are prohibited under the restricted government, we
hereafter refer to the restricted government as a "no transfers social con-
tract," or NTSC. At decision node 1 in Figure 1, each citizen must rank his
preference for the three possible states: anarchy, MR, and NTSC.
Of course, majority rule contracts can themselves take alternative
forms. Democratic societies can, and usually do, prohibit some forms of
wealth redistribution. These constitutional prohibitions can be explicit or
implicit. In the United States, we have adopted a representative democracy
that permits some, but not all, types or means of majoritarian redistribu-
tion. Some prohibitions are explicit; for example, the government may not
prohibit the free exercise of religion 7 or deny the right to vote on the
basis of race." Others fall under the rubric of general constitutional
restrictions which can be found in the Equal Protection, Due Process,
Takings and other clauses. The courts are left with the difficult task of
determining which types of redistribution are prohibited under these more
general clauses.
In an effort to understand American courts' treatment of discriminato-
ry taxes, we consider prohibitions that would command the unanimous
assent of citizens who are designing a majority rule government. Our
thought experiment therefore takes the following form: assume the citizens
have already chosen a majority rule government. What types of democratic
16 An early formal model of resource allocation under anarchy is presented in Winston C. Bush,
Individual Welfare in Anarchy, in EXPLORATIONS IN THE THEORY OF ANARcHY 5-18 (Gordon Tullock
ed., 1972).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
t U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
19981
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redistribution might the citizens unanimously agree to prohibit? Obviously,
our constitution can be amended without unanimous support. But, for
reasons we proffer later,'9 we contend that the courts incorporate their
own constitutional prohibitions on discriminatory taxes only when they
believe that over time everyone is worse off with the discriminatory tax.
Ultimately, we hope to use our thought experiment to help explain consti-
tutional interpretation.
Three caveats regarding our thought experiment must be pointed out
at the outset. First, when we focus on laws that redistribute wealth among
the citizens, we are primarily concerned with the effect rather than the
purpose of those laws.' We think it impossible to glean a single "pur-
pose" from laws supported by many citizens. Instead, we focus on the lik-
ely effects of the laws because some citizens will judge them based on
their expected benefits and burdens. Second, while we focus on the
original bargaining process here, our thought experiment applies at any
point during democratic governance. In other words, if a new type of
democratic redistribution is considered, and that redistribution will likely
make everyone worse off, then the prohibition could take the form of a
specific amendment to the constitution. Alternatively, the courts could
strike down the innovative redistribution under the pre-existing general
constitutional provisions. Finally, when we refer to unanimous agreements,
we do not count the preferences of citizens who expect to benefit from the
mere creation of coalition or transaction costs. Lobbyists, for example,
benefit when the government enacts laws that are not stable over time. If
coalitions shift, generating new demands for restructuring the redistribu-
tion, then lobbyists may experience an increased demand for their services.
Aside from the lobbyists who benefit from the creation of the coalition or
transaction costs, no benefits may accrue to any group of citizens over
time. To survive our unanimity rule, some group must anticipate a benefit
from redistribution that can be separated from the transaction costs associ-
ated with the redistribution.
To return to our inquiry, what types of democratic wealth redistribu-
tion would citizens unanimously agree to prohibit? In Interest Group
Politics Under Majority Rule,2 William R. Dougan and James M. Snyder
'9 See infra Part IV.
' Our contractarian approach, therefore, differs from Robert Nozick's. To Nozick, measures are
not "redistributive" unless they are motivated by a desire to redistribute. If measures are motivated by
other concerns, but have the effect of redistributing wealth, Nozick classifies them as non-redistributive.
See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 27 (1974).
2" William R. Dougan & James M. Snyder, Interest Group Politics Under Majority Rule, 61 J.
PUB. ECON. 49 (1996) [hereinafter Dougan & Snyder, Interest Group Politics]; see also William R.
Dougan & James M. Snyder, Are Rents Fully Dissipated?, 77 PuB. CHOIcE 793 (1993) [hereinafter
Dougan & Snyder, Rents].
(Vol. 6:4
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show that the answer turns on the critical distinction between "equalizing"
and "non-equalizing" transfers. As shown at decision node 2 in Figure 1,
citizens must choose whether to permit "equalizing" redistribution-wealth
redistribution that tends toward equality. By definition, equalizing redistri-
bution entails wealth transfers from the rich to the poor. The citizens must
also choose whether to permit "non-equalizing" redistribution-wealth
redistribution that does not tend toward equality. An example of a non-
equalizing redistribution is a tax that transfers wealth from people em-
ployed in the airline industry to people living in Texas, without regard to
the wealth or incomes of the employees burdened or the Texans benefitted.
In the public choice literature, wealth redistribution is often referred to as
"rent seeking."' A majority rule contract could permit one or both types
of redistribution. When both types of redistribution are permitted, we refer
to the contract as a pure majority rule contract. If both types of redistribu-
tion are prohibited, however, then the majority rule contract would be
equivalent to an NTSC. When some but not all majority redistribution is
permitted, we label the contract "limited majority rule."
While the society as a whole is better off under some social contract
than it could be under anarchy, it need not be the case that every individu-
al or group fares worse under anarchy than under any other social state.
Some people may be sufficiently more successful at predation than they
are at production as to make anarchy preferable to a social contract under
which they receive only what they produce (the NTSC). This could occur
for several reasons, but one simple reason could be that some people are
endowed with substantially more resources than others. If the number of
wealthy people is large relative to the number of poor people, then it is
possible, although certainly not inevitable, that the typical poor person is
better off attempting to take control of the assets of some wealthy person
than he would be if he allocated the limited resources at his command to
production. The greater the wealth disparity between the rich and poor, and
the greater the ease of identifying the rich and gaining control of their
assets, the smaller the likelihood that the typical poor person will agree to
a social contract that precludes all forms of redistribution from rich to
poor. Similarly, the greater the typical rich person's expected losses under
anarchy, the more willing he will be to agree to a social contract that does
not preclude such "equalizing" redistribution (MR or limited majority rule).
We do not claim that all social contracts will allow wealth redistribu-
tion. When the initial level of wealth inequality is not too great, or when
the technology of predatory activity induces a high level of effort and
2 See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAw 120-26 (1997); Gordon
Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 32 W. ECoN. J. 5 (1967) [hereinafter
Tullock, Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft].
1998]
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expenditures on both aggression and defense, anarchy may leave all
individuals worse off than they would be under the NTSC. We simply
observe that some social contracts that permit equalizing redistribution
could command unanimous agreement even in the absence of a veil of
ignorance.'
As elaborated in Part IH, under majority rule, some degree of redistri-
bution from rich to poor will emerge whenever votes are allocated more
equally than wealth. No wealthy individual with foresight would agree to
an MR constitution unless that individual thought he would be worse off
under anarchy than under the tax code he expects would emerge under
unrestricted majority rule. Similarly, no poor person would agree to an
NTSC unless he thought he would be less effective at predation under
anarchy than at production in a limited-government polity.
It is thus a fairly simple matter to see how progressive taxation could
garner the unanimous consent of the governed at the constitutional stage of
collective decision making. Since equalizing redistribution is a predictable
outcome of majoritarian voting over tax codes, a democratic constitution
that does not expressly prohibit progressive taxation should be presumed
by the courts to be a legitimate policy choice, if-as we assume-a key
function of the courts is to enforce the social contract.
Many types of redistribution do not systematically benefit the poor at
the expense of the wealthy. Instead, they impose costs and grant benefits
in ways that are essentially unrelated to people's income or wealth. A com-
plete theory of discriminatory taxes must be able to predict which, if any,
of these types of non-equalizing redistributions will be struck down by the
courts on the ground that they are incompatible with the social contract. As
shown at decision node 3 in Figure 1 and explained more fully in Part I,
Dougan and Snyder attached great significance to the degree of "symme-
try" in citizens' expectations regarding any particular policy proposal. A
redistributive policy that can plausibly benefit any one voter as readily as
it can benefit any other voter will generate symmetric expectations of its
effects. Because every voter is equally likely to benefit from such a policy,
she is also equally likely to share in its costs. When voters are risk averse,
or when lobbying is costly, a policy that gives rise to symmetric ex-
pectations of its impacts is one which every voter expects, on average, will
make him worse off. For that reason, every member of society who wants
a democratic social contract would prefer a constitution prohibiting
symmetric, non-equalizing redistribution to an otherwise identical constitu-
2 Despite this prior consent, the people who are taxed disproportionately once the constitution is
in place may nevertheless object to paying such taxes when payment is due. However, ex post
objection in this context should be viewed as "post-contractual opportunism" or as an effort to free ride
off the contributions of others. It is not, in our view, indicative of the terms of the social contract itself.
[Vol. 6:4
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tion allowing such policies.
An example may help to clarify the point. Consider whether a
legislature, in an effort to raise revenues, could impose a discriminatory tax
on residents according to the first letter of each resident's last name. If the
"S" residents are taxed more heavily, then Smith loses while the other
residents gain because they now can receive the same services while
paying lower taxes.24 But, before the letter is chosen, no one can predict
whether he will be in the benefitted or burdened group. Even after the
letter is chosen, there is likely nothing particularly stable about the
legislature's choice to tax the "S" surnames. Smith might pay a higher tax
this year, but next year he will lobby to have the letter changed to "J," and
then Jones will spend resources changing it to "C," and Cohen will fight
to change it to "M," and so on. Ex post, someone may receive a short-term
benefit or burden from the tax, but in the end, citizens spend considerable
resources trying to fix the details of the tax from year to year.'
If every person is as well situated as anyone else to be a member of
the winning coalition, every person has an equal expectation of winning or
losing from this policy. Over repeated legislative sessions, individuals will
sometimes win and sometimes lose. What is certain is that total output
(and income) in every period will be lower because of the surname taxes,
so that every person has an identical expectation at the start of every legis-
lative session that she will be a net loser on average. Despite this expecta-
tion, if such policies are allowed, it is individually rational for every voter
to try to be a member of the winning coalition rather than the losing coali-
tion. As a consequence, surname taxes may be pursued if they are not
expressly prohibited. A social contract that prohibits symmetric, non-
equalizing redistribution will be unanimously agreed upon, but the prohibi-
tion must be enforced by the courts. In fact, without court enforcement,
rent-seeking costs could become large enough to threaten the benefits of
even forming the government, in which case anarchy becomes the pre-
ferred political state. Thus, we predict that symmetric, non-equalizing
forms of taxation will be treated by the courts as unconstitutional.
The expected outcomes of many discriminatory taxes are "asymmet-
ric," however, because some non-equalizing taxes have fairly predictable
winners and losers. Taxes that facilitate forming stable coalitions to take
advantage of rent seeking opportunities can generate asymmetric expecta-
tions regarding the benefits of the taxes. As described in Part fl.B, some
citizens can form interest groups that can in turn unite into majority
coalitions with significantly less cost than others. If the cheaper cost
24 Alternatively, the "non-Smith" citizens can receive higher services while paying the same taxes.
Either way, the non-Smiths benefit at the expense of the Smiths.
' We assume, here, that citizens cannot avoid the tax by changing their last names.
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groups can effectively minimize competition from outsiders for the rents
obtained in legislative bargains, individuals in those groups expect to be
better off with discriminatory taxes than without them. If, for example, a
majority of the residents are named "Smith," then the Smiths might
actually prefer that taxes be levied on the basis of surnames, because the
Smiths can predict they will be insulated from the tax. Even if the Smiths
make up only a minority of the population, if they are a cohesive group
that anticipates consistently being part of the majority coalition, then they
may nevertheless support the surname tax. In either of these latter situa-
tions, the Smiths would not agree to prohibit any non-equalizing transfers
with asymmetric expectations, even though they reduce social welfare, for
the simple reason that those in stable winning coalitions expect a benefit
on balance from redistributive politics.
Let us summarize the relationship between democratic asymmetries
and the constitutionality of discriminatory taxes. If the American social
contract is as we have posited, then the courts, as constitutional checks on
legislative bargains, should, at a minimum, serve one vital function: to
prevent non-equalizing taxes that generate symmetric expected payoffs.
This entails striking down two types of wealth transfers. First, courts
should strike down taxes that are passed by "unstable coalitions," meaning
those that came together momentarily in support of the tax but can easily
break down by outsiders fighting to shift the tax burden. Second, they
should prevent transfers to groups that can form coalitions relatively
cheaply, but are likely to dissipate any gains through intra-group competi-
tion for the benefits. Here the coalition itself may appear stable, but the tax
does not enable a stable distribution of the benefits within the favored
group. If the favored individuals can be expected to fully dissipate the
rents in an effort to obtain a larger share of those rents, no one can expect
to benefit from the discriminatory tax on balance. The courts should strike
down these benefit-dissipating taxes with existing general constitutional
prohibitions rather than force the citizens to incur the costs of explicit
constitutional amendments.
Do the courts serve this minimalist function? Anyone who has ever
glanced at a U.S. tax code can see the effects of interest group politics.
When the provisions are challenged, the courts very rarely step in to
protect wealth-maximizing outcomes. Despite the dead-weight losses'
associated with wealth transfers, courts generally permit discriminatory
taxation so long as the legislature has not classified groups in an "arbi-
"Dead weight losses" are those losses from redistribution that are not transferred to anyone.
They represent forgone productive activities that decrease the wealth of society. See WALTER
NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 430 (3d ed. 1985); STEARNS, supra note 22, at 120-21.
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trary" or "unreasonable" fashion.27 Unfortunately, however, the courts
have never articulated a coherent distinction between arbitrary and non-
arbitrary classifications. We argue in Part III that in practice the courts
scrutinize discriminatory taxes according to the minimalist social contract
we describe, but they go no further without an independent constitutional
mandate.
Progressive taxation is a form of a wealth-equalizing transfer which
is not prohibited under our predicted social contract and almost never
struck down by U.S. courts. In contrast, the courts invalidate severely
discriminatory property taxes when those taxes apparently create non-
equalizing wealth redistribution with symmetric expectations. Other interest
group transfers are occasionally invalidated but much more often survive
scrutiny. While not a perfect explanatory theory, many of the Supreme
Court's decisions turn on a rough guess of the symmetry of citizens'
expectations. The taxes are impermissible only when the discriminatory
classification will likely lead to excessive competition among individuals
over time to avoid membership in the disfavored group or to reap a larger
share of the wealth transferred. In most cases where taxes are invalidated,
the group benefitted probably is no more efficient at forming coalitions
than the group disfavored. Continuous efforts to change the classification
will leave no individuals in a better net position, so the Court is confident
the tax would have been unanimously condemned ex ante.
To be sure, there are some cases that do not match our expectations.
The costs of enforcing the social contract may be prohibitively high in
some contexts. And in other contexts, the courts might well be deciding
cases based on pure normative preference. But, we offer the first positive
theory that we know of designed to explain the courts' typical distinction
between constitutional and unconstitutional discriminatory taxes.
We now turn to an exploration of redistribution under majority rule in
an effort to shed more light on the constitutionality of discriminatory taxes
in the United States. In Part 1I, we apply the model presented in Part II to
the case law on tax disparities.
I. SYMMETRIC AND ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATIONS
When citizens are given the right to vote, creating some form of
democratic decision making, then those citizens must determine whether to
insulate some activities from majoritarian influences. Recall from Part I,
that in a "pure democracy" all decisions regarding individual activities and
resource allocation are determined by majority rule. Of course, pure
" See infra Part Im.
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democracies are like perfectly competitive markets; both are useful
theoretical constructs, but neither is likely to be found in the "real world."
Instead, modem democratic societies all take the form of limited majority
rule. Nevertheless, once some decisions are based on majority sentiment,
redistributions of both wealth and utility are inevitable. The hard task is
determining which forms of redistribution to prohibit.
In almost every democratic society, whether representative democracy
or otherwise, some decisions are taken out of the political arena. Typically,
a nation's constitution describes those areas that are not subject to popular
determination. In the United States Constitution, for example, the right to
speak and to choose one's religious affiliation cannot be abrogated even
though a majority of the population might prefer to establish an official
religion or ban speech that is critical of a dominant political party.' Some
limitations on the power of majorities will be described in very general
terms that reflect notions of fairness. Guarantees of "equal protection" and
"due process," and guarantees against the uncompensated "taking" of
private property are common examples." Our courts are assigned the task
of reducing these general terms to a set of concrete restraints on majority
decision making.
Taxation can be a very tempting means for majorities to transfer
wealth from minority groups to themselves because the dead weight losses
to direct cash transfers are often smaller than those associated with
indirect, or regulatory transfers. Where the Constitution specifically
protects activities, the Supreme Court has consistently struck down taxes
that burden those rights. When legislatures place special taxes on religious
institutions or the press, for example, those taxes are held unconstitution-
al.' How do the courts treat taxes that redistribute wealth on other bases?
Any nonuniform tax is a taking of private property and fails to guarantee
equal treatment under the laws. In theory, then, courts could strike down
all nonuniform taxes. In practice, however, the courts have carved out a
much more limited role in checking tax legislation. A review of discrimi-
natory tax cases indicates modem courts tend to strike down only those
nonuniform taxes that, from an ex ante perspective, would be unanimously
condemned by U.S. citizens. Otherwise, the taxes are upheld.
Which taxes would be unanimously condemned? The answer turns on
the symmetry of expected payoffs from the particular transfer game at
issue. And the symmetry of payoffs depends on the stability of the political
coalition that formed to support the tax transfer. In section A below we
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
z9 See, e.g., id. amend. V and XIV, § 1.
See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
583 (1983) (tax to limit circulation of information); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250
(1936) (tax on press).
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consider "equalizing transfers," or wealth redistribution from unequal
endowments toward equal consumption. In section B, we consider "non-
equalizing" transfers, or transfers designed to redistribute wealth on bases
other than achieving equality.
A. Equalizing Transfers Under Pure Majority Rule
In this section, we present a simple model of democracy when
individual wealth endowments differ. The model is a parallel to the classic
"divide-the-dollar" game used by economists.3' We use this model to
illustrate a very simple proposition: assuming sufficiently unequal wealth
endowments and sufficiently modest coalition costs, democratic decision
making inevitably results in wealth redistribution toward equality.32
1. Transferring Wealth
Although the results of our model hold for a democracy with any
number of citizens, for simplicity we assume that the democracy has three
rational, risk neutral citizens, or players, named Larry, Curly and Moe.
Also for simplicity, assume the total wealth in the society is $100, but the
initial endowments of the players are unequal. Specifically, assume:
Larry = $40
Curly = $40
Moe = $20
Assume these endowments have already incorporated the costs to each of
enforcing property rights to these endowments. In other words, the endow-
ments listed represent the dollar amounts each can consume without
redistribution. Suppose further that all decisions, including the redistribu-
tion of society's wealth, are made according to majority rule unless an
alternative decision making rule is specified in the constitution. Unless
prohibited by the social contract, simple majority rule allows any coalition
of two players to tax the third member and transfer those resources to its
members. Assume also the tax and transfer can be achieved costlessly33
3' See MARTIN SHIUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SociAL SCIENCES 2 (1982); Emerson Niou &
Peter C. Ordeshook, Universalism and Congress, 29 AM. J. POL. Sdl. 246 (1985); Barry R. Weingast,
A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. So. 245 (1979).
32 This proposition is more formally presented and proven in Dougan & Snyder, Interest Group
Politics, supra note 21.
3 Implicitly, we are also assuming that each player's supply of productive activities is perfectly
inelastic. By this we mean that each player produces the same amount, regardless of his expectations
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and all players share the following three expectations:
1) only minimal winning coalitions (here, coalitions of two mem-
bers) will form;
2) all minimal winning coalitions (MWC's) are equally likely to
form; and
3) the MWC that forms will divide the total wealth equally among
all the members of the coalition (here, two members will end up
with $50 each).
Given these expectations, it is impossible for the players to tell which
coalitions will form in any iteration of the voting game. Because the
majority coalitions will likely shift over time if the odd man out can attract
one member of a winning coalition away to form a new winning coalition
in the next period, from an ex ante perspective, each of the players antici-
pates a 2/3 likelihood of receiving $50 and a 1/3 likelihood of receiving
$0. Each player's expected payoff from any future voting is $33.33. Our
rich citizens, Larry and Curly, prefer a prohibition on majority rule wealth
transfers, but Moe, who was endowed with only $20, clearly prefers
democratic transfers. And, without a prohibition on redistribution, even
Larry and Curly are tempted to redistribute wealth, because each is better
off in a majority coalition ($50) than either is outside it ($0) or with his
initial endowment ($40).
If a majority of the population is "poor" in the sense that their
expected payoffs from the transfer game are greater than their initial
endowments, then the transfer game receives majority support. Suppose,
for example, that our players' wealth endowments were instead:
Larry = $60
Curly = $20
Moe = $20
Now, Larry always prefers his initial endowment to redistribution, but
Curly and Moe always prefer redistribution. In either event, if wealth
transfers were costless, then a society with equal votes but unequal
endowments would necessarily include some citizen support for redistribu-
tion of the wealth. In a democracy, then, the poorest members would not
agree to a flat prohibition on wealth redistribution from rich to poor.
Of course, all redistribution entails costs, which we initially assumed
away. These costs are key to any social contract and take several forms.
First, individuals may be risk averse, which means they prefer to pay
regarding the transfer of the wealth that he and the others produce. We relax this assumption later.
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something to avoid the risk that the other members will reduce their
wealth. Second, there are costs to negotiating over coalition formation. To
form a winning coalition, each of the players must convince one of the
other players to side with him rather than with the third member. Indeed,
we assumed that only "minimal" winning coalitions would form because
internal bargaining costs generally rise with the number of members in the
coalition.34 Third, in representative democracies, there are also opportunity
costs of voting and influencing policymakers. Even if a majority coalition
is stable, it must inform its delegate of preferred policies and monitor the
actions of the delegate, whose interests may not fully coincide with her
constituents' interests. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the transfer
of resources entails dead-weight costs. For example, if Larry knows there
is some risk that Curly and Moe will take his wealth, then Larry has less
incentive to work to produce income because he expects to consume only
2/3 of what he actually produces. Moreover, some individuals may choose
to specialize in creating favorable redistribution rather than producing
wealth for society. Once we take into account the costs of redistribution,
then the preferences of the citizens regarding majority rule become
somewhat ambiguous.
We incorporate the total costs of redistribution into our model by
denoting them g(c). Now the after tax wealth of the winning coalition
cannot exceed $100-g(c), because g(c) is lost in an effort to achieve the
transfer. Assuming the same three expectations about minimal winning
coalitions hold, with costly redistribution the expected after tax payoff to
each player is [100-g(c)]13. This is so because, if a player is a member of
a winning coalition, he will consume [100-g(c)]/2, and he assesses a 2/3
probability of ending up in the winning coalition. Thus, each player's
expected payoff is:
[(100-g(c))/2][23] [0][13] = [100-g(c)]/3.
Once we take the costs of redistribution into account, Moe's prefer-
ence for majority rule turns on the magnitude of those costs.3" But as long
as those costs do not exceed 40% of the total wealth in our example, Moe
will prefer redistribution. The greater the relative wealth of rich and poor
players, the greater the costs must be before the players could achieve a
' For a discussion of decision making costs as a function of the size of the group needed to agree
to a policy change, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 68-
72 (1974).
3 Recall that when Larry and Curly were "rich," they preferred a prohibition on redistribution,
even when the redistribution proved costless. Presumably they prefer majority rule redistribution even
less when it entails social costs, but to know for certain, the redistribution costs would have to be
compared with any changes in the costs of property rights enforcement across the two regimes.
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unanimous agreement prohibiting redistribution. Suppose, for example, that
Moe was initially endowed with only $10 of the total $100 in wealth.
Then, so long as coalition costs are less than 70% of the total wealth, he
still prefers majority rule.
2. Reducing Transfer Costs
Implicit in these conclusions is an insight familiar to public choice
theorists: the lower the costs of a wealth transfer, the more likely the
transfer will succeed.' How might a winning coalition minimize the costs
of equalizing redistribution? There are several possibilities, but we mention
three here. First, if a majority coalition can credibly commit to limiting the
maximum tax rate on the wealthy,37 then the dead-weight costs and the
costs associated with risk aversion will be reduced. If each wealthy
member knows he will retain at least some of his wealth regardless of
whether he ends up in the winning coalition, then the down-side risk of
losing the transfer game is smaller. And, if he is guaranteed to keep at
least some of his income, then he may have more incentive to produce.
Moreover, confiscating all of an individual's wealth leaves him worse off
than he would be in anarchy, which itself becomes an implicit violation of
the social contract that adopted democratic decision making in the first
place.3" Of course, lower tax rates mean that members of the winning
coalition consume a smaller percentage of total wealth, but Moe, our poor
citizen, might ultimately prefer a smaller slice of a larger pie.
Second, the poorer members might reduce coalition costs with class
identification.39 Let us assume, for example, that members of a larger
society choose a representative democracy in which politicians compete for
office. Those politicians can ensure election by fusing together a stable
winning coalition of voters. A politician may well find that he can garner
a large number of votes by championing the interests of the poor and
working classes. Class identification helps keep the group together for the
' See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,
98 QJ. ECON. 371 (1983) [hereinafter Becker, Theory of Competition].
"' This could be done by promise, by constitutional rule, or by electing a representative who is
himself a member of the wealthiest class.
' Indeed, economists have used anarchic models to establish that a social contract typically
entails at least some protection of private property. See Jack Hirshleifer, Anarchy and Its Breakdown,
103 J. POL. ECON. 26 (1995); John Umbeck, Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and
Initial Distribution of Property Rights, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 38, 40 (1981). For a simple anarchic model
where identical individuals choose a social contract incorporating property rights with positive enforce-
ment costs, see Goran Skogh & Charles Stuart, A Contractarian Theory of Property Rights and Crime,
84 ScAND. J. ECON. 27 (1982).
" Cf. Lorenzo Kristov et al., Pressure Groups and Redistribution, 48 J. PUB. ECON. 135, 152
(1992) (social affinities make association and communication easier).
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purposes of redistribution. In effect, then, class identification might force
a relaxation of the second expectation listed above; in this situation, some
minimal winning coalitions are more likely to form than others.
Third, cash or direct wealth transfers typically entail lower dead-
weight costs than indirect forms of transfers.' Indeed, equalizing redistri-
bution is more likely to take the form of direct transfers than is non-
equalizing redistribution. For an explanation of the differences, we now
turn to an analysis of non-equalizing redistribution.
B. Non-equalizing Redistribution
Equalizing redistribution is a likely result of unequal wealth endow-
ments and equal votes because some individuals expect to be better off
with the redistribution even when the coalitions formed to achieve the
redistribution are unstable. In contrast, non-equalizing transfers, or those
that do not tend toward equality of consumption, are unlikely to be enacted
unless there are particular types of asymmetries among participants in the
political process. For non-equalizing redistributions, the asymmetries
depend upon stable coalitions that support the particular redistribution. In
fact, whether some individuals expect to be made better off by a non-
equalizing transfer game turns on the form of the transfer itself. As we
explain below, asymmetries in expected outcomes are more likely when
those transfers are indirect.
Some government policies are designed to transfer wealth regardless
of initial endowments. Agricultural subsidies, tariffs and import restric-
tions, and occupational licensing requirements are just a few examples.
These policies all have the effect of making the members of a domestic
industry better off, while passing the costs of those redistribution programs
to consumers of the goods or services. In addition, these transfers all
appear to be indirect. Economists have established that direct cash transfers
are generally more efficient than the more complex government pro-
grams" typically associated with non-equalizing wealth redistribution.
Why, then, are these transfers typically indirect? Some economists have
posited that indirect transfers fool the public by concealing the rent seeking
nature of the legislaion.42 This explanation is not entirely compelling,
however, because often the public is not fooled. In a recent article, Dougan
4' See EDGAR K. BROWNING & JACQUELINE M. BROWNING, PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE PRICE
SYSTEM 123 (4th ed. 1994).
4' See id.
' See, e.g., Gary Becker, Comment, 19 J.L. & ECON. 245, 246 (1976) [hereinafter Becker,
Comment] (indirect transfers commonly explained by voter ignorance); Phillip Nelson, Political Infor-
mation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 315, 323 (1976) (describing voter ignorance as "dominant view").
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and Snyder offer another rationale: indirect transfers enable "asymmetric
expectations" that are necessary to make the transfers stable and therefore
beneficial to the recipients.43 To explain their rationale, we return to the
model presented in section A above.
1. Symmetric Expectations
Assume that the same three players have formed a democracy.
Because we are analyzing non-equalizing redistribution, assume that the
three players are identically endowed with wealth. As a consequence, any
wealth transfers will tend to be non-equalizing. Suppose therefore their
total wealth is again $100, and each is endowed with $33.33. Assume also
the three players play the same majority rule transfer game. Any two
players can take the wealth of the third and split the proceeds equally.
Assume further that the same three expectations regarding coalition
formation hold:
1) only minimal winning coalitions form (here, two players);
2) all MWC's are equally likely (in other words, the players share
no natural affinities that make it easier for a particular majority to
form); and
3) MWC's that form divide the proceeds equally among the
coalition's members.
Expectations 2 and 3 taken together define the conditions under which
individual expectations regarding the outcome of the transfer are
"symmetric." That is, no player expects to be better off with redistribution
than any of the other players. If the redistribution is costless, then after the
transfer each player expects to have:
$50(2t3) $O(113) = $33.33
Larry, Curly and Moe are each indifferent between a rule permitting non-
equalizing transfers and a rule prohibiting them. If instead, however, the
transfers entail any costs, then the players' expected payoffs fall below
their initial endowments, and everyone is made worse off under the
transfer game. Because all transfers entail costs, individuals who have
symmetric expectations regarding outcomes would unanimously agree to a
constitutional prohibition on the transfers themselves."
'3 See generally Dougan & Snyder, Rents, supra note 21.
We are assuming, of course, that the coalition costs avoided from imposing the restriction are
greater than the costs of generating and enforcing the prohibition. Courts can use general constitutional
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This simple divide-the-dollar paradigm is useful for analyzing some
types of discriminatory taxation. That is, there are situations when the
assumptions of equal endowments and equally likely MWC's do not
contradict reality in any critical sense. For example, if a society is com-
posed of many small groups with divergent interests, it might be difficult
to make predictions about who will be in the majority in any given period.
If that majority shifts over time with bargaining, individuals can be
expected to be in the majority sometimes but not others. Sometimes the
individual or small group may be chosen in a democracy to bear a dispro-
portionate burden of the aggregate tax bill, in effect redistributing wealth
toward the majority. If unstable majority opportunism is a likely result of
legislative bargaining, the individuals cannot predict who will likely be
singled out to carry that burden. In these situations, individuals' expected
outcomes from legislative bargains are symmetric.
Even though everyone is worse off in the end, the legislature might
enact tax laws without realizing the long-term symmetric losses they entail.
Alternatively, legislators might face relatively short time horizons which
induce them to ignore long-term losses in order to provide their constitu-
ents with short-term benefits. To protect themselves from either possibility,
the citizens would support a constitutional prohibition against these forms
of non-equalizing discrimination.
2. Asymmetric Expectations
Of course, some legislative bargains do persist over time. And some
political entrepreneurs and interest groups seem better able to form
majority coalitions than others. How, then, do interest groups succeed in
obtaining transfers with positive net benefits to the members of the
group?4' Our simple model identifies two requirements. First, the interest
group must be a persistent component of the majority coalition. Second,
allocation of the benefits among the individual members of the interest
group also must be stable.
To explain, we return to our model. Within that model, net benefits
can only be reduced by relaxing one or more of the three expectations
listed above. Consider first the effect of relaxing the second expectation,
that all minimal winning coalitions are equally likely to form. When the
unrealistic Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" is lifted, we can take into account
the fact that not all majority coalitions are equally likely to form. Some
prescriptions of fairness to eliminate the costs of incorporating specific transfer prohibitions into the
constitution.
'3 Dougan and Snyder describe the conditions under which groups can obtain positive rents from
legislation. See Dougan & Snyder, Rents, supra note 21.
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political groups form more naturally than others as a result of shared
affinities of the group's members. Those that can form more easily expe-
rience reduced coalition costs because natural affinities make it harder for
non-members to attract group members away from their winning coalition.
To illustrate our point, suppose Larry and Moe are members of the
same religion or cultural ancestry. Their similarities might make it easier
for them to interact with each other than with Curly, for individuals
typically prefer to associate with others who share similar backgrounds,
beliefs, and talents.' As a result, they can form a winning coalition more
cheaply than either can form a coalition with Curly. Members of a single
profession might also form a successful political group.47 Common exam-
ples today include the American Bar Association, the American Medical
Association, and the Semiconductor Industry Association. Not only do they
share common interests and endeavors, but it is also easier for them to
generate policies that will likely benefit everyone within the group. If a
given proposal will yield common benefits, then it will yield support from
all the members.
Contrast these similarities with others that will not likely produce
stable coalitions. Take eye color, for example. If Larry and Curly have
brown eyes and Moe has blue eyes, then the brown-eyed people could
form a coalition to impose a tax on the blue-eyed individual. Unfortunately
for Larry and Curly, there is nothing inherently stable about a brown-eyed
coalition. Moe could easily convince one of these two to form an alterna-
tive coalition with him organized along some other basis. If Moe can
organize a coalition based on a more fundamental affinity such as religion,
ethnicity, age, or occupation, then Moe's alternative coalition is much
more likely to endure. If the affinity is strong enough, then it becomes too
costly for the person outside the coalition to compete to bid away someone
to form a new winning coalition. In fact, we do tend to see political
organizers focusing on those affinities that reduce the costs of stable co-
alition formation.'
While forming stable coalitions is necessary to successfully obtain
transfers, it is not alone sufficient. The coalition must find ways to allocate
tax benefits at a cost sufficiently low to preserve those benefits for the
coalition members. In other words, the third expectation listed above (i.e.,
' See, e.g., PHILIP A. MUNDo, INTEREST GROUPS 10 (1992) (table discussing U.S. interest group
organizational focus on occupation, religion, veteran status, and union status); Ronald Hrebenar,
Change, Transition, and Growth in Southern Interest Group Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN
THE SOUTHERN STATES 321, 338-39 (Ronald Hrebenar & Clive S. Thomas eds., 1992) (listing 40 most
effective national lobbying interests, including those representing occupational, gaming, abortion, senior
citizen, religious, women's and minority groups).
4 See MUNDO, supra note 46, at 10.
" See, e.g., Kristov, supra note 39.
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MWC's that form divide the proceeds equally among its members) dodges
an important problem for political groups: once the group manages to
transfer wealth from others, how do the members of the successful coali-
tion divide the proceeds among themselves? Unless the members
precommit to a stable mechanism for distributing the benefits, considerable
resources may be wasted when the members vie for the proceeds. Every
parent knows, for example, that if an adult places a large piece of choco-
late cake in front of two children to share, the children are likely to
squabble over which child gets which portion of the cake. Potential solu-
tions can increase the happiness of the children. The adult could cut the
piece into two before presenting the cake to the children and decide which
child will receive which piece. Or the children can adopt the classic "cut
and choose rule" whereby one child divides the cake into two portions and
the other child chooses which portion she prefers.
Similar squabbling raises potential problems for political coalitions.
Suppose Christians form a coalition to tax non-Christians and transfer the
cash to the Christians. Each Christian sect will vie for as large a portion of
the cash as possible. With each sect attempting to persuade the coalition it
deserves a larger portion, the costs associated with these attempts threaten
to dissipate the net benefit of the transfer. Moreover, religious sects that
were "non-Christian" before the tax will now attempt to appear "Christian"
in order to share the benefits of the tax structure. Indeed, some political
choice theorists have posited that potential recipients of "rents" will likely
completely dissipate all the benefits from those rents in an effort to obtain
them.'9 In other words, each is willing to spend a sum up to the expected
benefits from the transfer in order to get the transfer, and, on net, no one
can expect to be better off from rent seeking. To eliminate squabbling after
the transfer, the Christians could propose legislation that describes the
allocation of the cash to individual sects, but then the dissipating rent
seeking occurs before the legislation is passed. Either way, the rents get
dissipated.
Or do they? Certainly if the transfer takes the form of cash, rent
dissipation is likely quite large. But, suppose instead the transfer takes a
different form. Doctors, for example, could attempt to transfer cash to
themselves from non-doctors, but then each doctor fights for a larger share.
Even if the doctors could agree to divide the cash pro rata, the transfer
attracts others into the medical profession to claim a share of the cash. The
larger the number of claimants, the less each doctor receives. Doctors
might be better off with a non-cash transfer, in the form of an occupational
licensing requirement. In all states today, one who wishes to practice
' See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807,
809 (1975); Tullock, Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, supra note 22.
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medicine must attend medical school and be admitted to the medical bar.
By limiting the number of people who are licensed to practice medicine,
reduced competition enables doctors to charge higher fees for their services
than they could with more people competing in the field. Those higher fees
are as good as cash for doctors. In addition, the licensing requirement
makes it more difficult for those outside the profession to enter the medical
field in order to benefit from the transfer. Finally, the licensing require-
ment prevents costly bargaining by existing doctors over the distribution of
the proceeds. The allocation mechanism is built into the requirement.
Certainly, not all doctors will benefit equally from the licensing require-
ment because the supply curves for the individual competing doctors likely
will differ. Nevertheless, each doctor can, if she wishes, increase the
number of hours each year that she treats patients and consequently reap
a greater benefit from the increased fees. The non-cash nature of the
transfer prevents doctors from squabbling over the allocation of the
benefits. To be sure, the licensing requirement entails more administrative
costs than a pure cash transfer, but these costs are more than offset by the
reduced intra-coalition costs of distributing the proceeds.'
In other words, doctors can expect to be made better off on net with
the indirect transfer than they can with a direct cash transfer. If doctors
expect to be part of a winning political coalition because their professional
affinities lower the costs of forming a political coalition, then they expect
to benefit from a constitutional rule that permits licensing requirements. In
this sense, individual expectations regarding the transfer game are "asym-
metric": some coalitions are more likely to form than others, and the indi-
viduals within the coalition can prevent rent dissipation that results from
outside entry and intra-group lobbying.
Indirect transfers are common forms of rent seeking for other groups
as well. Consider, for example, price supports on agriculture.5 ' The
farmers can lobby for government efforts to keep the price of farm prod-
ucts above some specified level by, for example, purchasing and then
destroying excess produce. Because all farmers benefit from the price
supports, political organizers find it easy to organize the group to support
the measures. Some farmers benefit more than others from the supports,
but the non-cash nature of the transfer prevents rent dissipation. And to a
large extent, farmers can exclude others from joining the coalition to share
in the rents because the supply of an essential farming input, here land, is
relatively fixed.
o See Dougan & Snyder, Interest Group Politics, supra note 21, at 63-64.
5' See, e.g., Ronald N. Johnson, Retail Price Controls in the Dairy Industry: A Political Coalition
Argument, 28 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1985).
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C. Minimalist Prohibitions
We now return to the question we initially posed. Assume that a
democratic society permits discriminatory taxation unless, viewed ex ante,
the transfers are expected to make everyone worse off on net. Which
transfers, if any, would be prohibited by the society? As described in
Figure 1, redistributive policies can take the form of equalizing transfers or
non-equalizing transfers. Because the poor expect to be made better off
with equalizing transfers, they would not agree categorically to prohibit
them. We would expect to see some progressive taxation in democracies,
for example. Progressive taxation might well be capped, though, to contain
the dead-weight costs of extreme redistribution.
For non-equalizing transfers, support for prohibition will turn on
whether individuals' expected outcomes from the particular type of transfer
are symmetric or asymmetric. If people cannot predict ex ante whether
they are likely to be in the group benefitted or the group burdened, then
they will agree to prohibit the transfer. Predictions are difficult, for
example, if the coalitions that form to achieve a particular type of transfer
are usually unstable. Sometimes the individual expects to benefit, and
sometimes he expects to lose. In the end, playing the game becomes a
losing proposition because everyone expects to lose on net once the costs
of the wealth transfers are taken into account. If individuals have symmet-
ric expectations regarding some wealth transfers, those transfers will be
prohibited.
If individual expectations are asymmetric, however, some expect a net
positive return from lobbying for tax deductions or for taxes imposed on
others that inure to the benefit of a group within the winning coalition.52
Those individuals may not agree to prohibit the transfers, even though the
aggregate wealth of society is reduced as a consequence of the transfers, if
their own expectations are sufficiently asymmetric. After all, politicians are
rewarded for maximizing the well-being of their constituents, not the
welfare of society as a whole. When affinities generate stable coalitions,
and benefitted groups can minimize intra-group competition for the pro-
ceeds, then expectations are asymmetric. If instead, competition within a
winning coalition will likely dissipate the benefits of a transfer, then
otherwise asymmetric expectations become symmetric, where even the
winning coalition expects to lose in the end. And, as we discussed above,
asymmetries are more likely to occur with indirect wealth transfers than
with direct ones. In the end, then, under a minimalist constitution, only one
type of transfer is clearly prohibited: non-equalizing transfers with sym-
52 See Dougan & Snyder, Interest Group Politics, supra note 21, at 57-61.
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metric expectations.
A review of discriminatory tax cases indicates that the courts have
adopted this very minimalist view in scrutinizing transfers under equal
protection, due process, takings, and uniform taxation provisions of the
state and federal constitutions. The modem courts only strike down taxes
when the type of tax in question is likely to make everyone worse off in
the end. In other words, the courts' line between arbitrary and nonarbitrary
non-equalizing transfers often seems to correspond with Dougan and
Snyder's distinction between symmetric and asymmetric expectations. We
now review some of the discriminatory tax cases to illustrate the point. In
Part IV, we proffer an explanation of why the courts have steered this very
minimalist course in checking legislative bargains.
I]. DISCRIMINATORY TAXES N AMERIcAN COURTS
In this Part, we apply our model to American case law on discrimina-
tory taxation. Despite the categorical language of the Equal Protection
Clause, 3 American courts have never categorically prohibited discrimina-
tory taxes. Instead, the Supreme Court has taken the position that legisla-
tures can break individuals into classes for separate tax treatment so long
as the classification is "based upon some reasonable ground" and is "not
a mere arbitrary selection."54 As stated in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav-
ings Bank
[Tihe State may distinguish, select, and classify objects of legislation, and
necessarily this power must have a wide range of discretion. It is not without
limitation, of course. "[C]lear and hostile discriminations against particular
persons and classes, especially such as are of [an] unusual character, unknown
to the practice of our governments, might be obnoxious to the constitutional
prohibition.""
But which discriminatory taxes are "arbitrary" or "clear and hostile," and
what underlying theory have the courts used to decide the cases?
Section A describes the case law on progressive taxation and concludes
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("nor shall any State ... deny to any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of the laws").
' Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Say. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 294 (1898); see also Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 344 (1989) ("A State may divide different kinds
of property into classes and assign to each class a different tax burden so long as those divisions and
burdens are reasonable."); State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931) ("The fact
that a statute discriminates in favor of a certain class does not make it arbitrary, if the discrimination
is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain
it.") (citations omitted).
" Magoun, 170 U.S. at 294 (quoting Bell's Gap R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237
(1889)).
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that the Supreme Court typically has interpreted the federal Constitution
consistently with our contractarian model, which predicts no unanimous
agreement prohibiting equalizing wealth transfers. In Section B, we discuss
federal and state treatment of discriminatory property taxation, including
general property taxes and special assessments. Here too, the courts' role as
a safeguard against at least extreme discrimination comports with our
model. In section C, we consider other classifications. Although the
correlation with our model is less than perfect, the Supreme Court often
appears to base distinctions on a rough guess about the symmetry of
individual expectations.'
A. Income and Wealth Based Progressive Taxation
Our model of minimalist prohibitions predicts that while the social
contract in the United States might well forbid some forms of discriminato-
ry taxation, at least some redistribution toward equality would be permitted,
indeed expected. One prominent example is progressive taxation, a mainstay
of U.S. revenue-raising policies in the last century. Because progressive
taxation is one of the least costly wealth-equalizing mechanisms, the
minimalist contractarian theory predicts that the Constitution would either
explicitly or implicitly allow some progressive taxation.
Not surprisingly, then, the Supreme Court has never interpreted the
United States Constitution to forbid progressive income or wealth taxes.
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. 7 is often incorrectly cited to the
contrary, however.5" In Pollock, which preceded the adoption of the
Sixteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court invalidated portions of a two
percent federal tax on individual, business and corporate income above
$4,000 on any gains, profits, or income from any property, rents, interest,
dividends, salaries, or any other source.59 While the tax technically in-
corporated mild progressivity, the equally divided Court expressed no
opinion on the constitutionality of the general income tax scheme. The
Court was considering, among other issues, whether all or part of the tax
statute violated the Apportionment Clause of the Constitution, which
provides: "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
5' We leave for another paper a discussion of taxes that attempt to discriminate against interstate
commerce. The coalition formation requires a slightly different model, and the incidence of the tax
burdens becomes complicated and varies depending on whether we consider import or export taxes.
57 157 U.S. 429 (1895), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, overruled in part by South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
' See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship,
87 MICH. L. REv. 189, 205 n.67 (1988); Morton J. Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825,
1828 (1987).
5 See Pollock, 157 U.S. at 434-35 n.1, 583.
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several States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers ... ." With respect to the tax scheme, however, the
Court struck down only the tax on the rents and income from real estate,
reasoning that since a tax on real estate had historically been considered a
"direct tax" under the Apportionment Clause, taxing the income flow from
the real estate must also constitute a "direct tax."' Because the tax was
not assessed in proportion to the population, as required for all direct taxes,
it was unconstitutional.62
Of course, the concept of "direct tax" was nebulous at best, as evi-
denced by the Court's extensive discussion in Pollock of several possible
definitions of the term.63 The Court could easily have used this ambiguity
to strike down taxes it found objectionable for other reasons. But both
before and after Pollock, the Court upheld progressive tax schemes. For
example, the Court in Springer v. United States, upheld the validity of an
1864 federal tax on incomes, gains, and profits by classifying it as an
indirect tax not requiring apportionment." Similarly, the Court had also
upheld progressive federal inheritance and estate taxes as "indirect." Nev-
ertheless, the Pollock decision posed a problem for federal taxation. By
holding that a tax on income from property was a "direct" tax, Pollock
potentially signaled a widespread prohibition on Congress' ability to use
progressive income taxes more generally.'
To restore fully the federal government's ability to tax income, from
real estate as well as from other sources, the Sixteenth Amendment was
added to the Constitution. It gives Congress the power to impose income
taxes without requiring apportionment among the states.67 The Sixteenth
'0 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
6, Pollock, 157 U.S. at 580-83.
6 See id. at 583.
' See id. at 558-83. The Pollock Court described the common understanding of direct taxes as
follows:
Ordinarily all taxes paid primarily by persons who can shift the burden upon some one else,
or who are under no legal compulsion to pay them, are considered indirect taxes; but a tax
upon property holders in respect of their estates, whether real or personal, or of the income
yielded by such estates, and the payment of which cannot be avoided, are direct taxes.
Id. at 558. Yet, in Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1880), the Court concluded that direct
taxes included only capitation and real estate taxes. At least some of the justices in Pollock were
prepared to expand the Springer definition.
' See Springer, 102 U.S. at 602.
'5 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 78-83 (1900); see also New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256
U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
' See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic
Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. CmI. L. REv. 324, 350-52 (1985) (Pollock signaled a shift in the Court's
position on income taxes because twice in the preceding twenty-five years it had held that income taxes
were indirect).
67 The Amendment reads, "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to
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Amendment leaves many questions unanswered, however, for it is well
known that a legislature's power to tax cannot be used to achieve unconsti-
tutional ends." More specifically, the Court still had to grapple with
whether certain forms of state and federal income and wealth taxation, in-
cluding progressive tax schemes, violate other provisions of the Constitu-
tion, such as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
The Supreme Court has rarely scrutinized progressive taxation under
these clauses,69 but a few cases indicate the Court's longstanding approval
of progressive schemes. For example, in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Rail-
road,7" the Court upheld a federal income tax scheme with progressively
increasing rates and exemptions unavailable for individuals with incomes
exceeding $20,000. The plaintiff asserted that the tax violated the Due
Process Clause7' because it was based solely on wealth, arguing that "the
progressive feature of the tax cause[d] it to transcend the conception of all
taxation and to be a mere arbitrary abuse of power."72 The Court rejected
the plaintiff's proposition, and noted that progressive taxes have existed in
the United States since "the very early history of the Government."73
In another case, Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank,74 the Court
reviewed Illinois' progressive state inheritance law, under which the tax rate
increased with the value of the estate or property received by an heir. Since
both the size of the estate and the amount transferred reflect the decedent's
wealth, the progressive rate is consistent with our model. Not surprisingly,
then, the Court held the law to be consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause.75
any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
' See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) ("It is an established principle that the
attainment of a prohibited end may not be accomplished under the pretext of the exertion of powers
which are granted."); see also Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
' See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1877) (in case predating application of Bill
of Rights guarantees to state and local governments, Court declines to consider whether unequal
taxation by state constitutes unconstitutional taking); BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 1, at 6-11.
70 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
7' U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.").
' Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 25.
73 Id.
14 170 U.S. 283 (1898).
" See id. at 299-301; see also U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"). However, another aspect of the tax
scheme upheld in Magoun puzzles us. The scheme also discriminated on the basis of the heir's relation
to the decedent: that is, close relatives paid a lower tax rate on the size of the inheritance received than
did more distant relatives, and all other heirs paid even higher tax rates, which were levied on the value
of the entire estate. Although it may be that legacies to nonrelatives are primarily a luxury of the rich,
the state could have effected wealth-based transfers much more cleanly with a single progressive rate
structure. The scheme may serve a dual purpose, however. If the decedent is wealthy, then the higher
tax seems to be a form of redistribution predicted by our model. If instead the decedent is poor, then
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The Supreme Court has not heard a case challenging the constitutional-
ity of progressive taxation in recent years, probably because it so clearly
signaled that progressive schemes are constitutional. However, we predicted
that the United States Constitution likely includes a limitation on the
amount of permissible redistribution toward equality. Are there any limita-
tions built into the constitutional scheme?
Perhaps the Due Process Clause protects against the most extreme
redistribution schemes. The Supreme Court has at times used this clause to
provide a minimal guarantee that our legislative bargains be at least sub-
stantially fair.76 The Court has indicated that it would invalidate taxes
found to be "palpably arbitrary and unreasonable"'  or "harsh and oppres-
sive."78 But in more recent years the Court has retreated away from using
the Due Process Clause to ensure substantive fairness, as least with regard
to economic liberties," and the Court has yet to find a progressive tax
scheme impermissibly redistributive. Indeed, as early as 1935, the Court
signaled its refusal to strike down excessive taxes by stating, "[o]nce the
lawfulness of the method of levying the tax is affirmed, the judicial
function ceases. He deludes himself by a false hope who supposes that, if
this court shall at some future time conclude the burden of the exaction has
become inordinately oppressive, it can interdict the tax."'
This raises an interesting question: why has the Court not found it
necessary to strike down a single redistributive scheme? One possible
answer is that the limited redistribution contract is more accurate, but that
the Court is manned with socialists who refuse to enforce the social contract
properly. On the other hand, United States history has been characterized by
a fair amount of wealth redistribution that has been growing markedly in
recent decades,8 but we hardly approach an "egalitarian society."' More
the discriminatory tax helps ensure that his limited resources are used to support his family after his
death. Otherwise, society might be forced to support that family by effecting yet another costly wealth
transfer. While incentive-based taxes are largely beyond the scope of our paper, this one could
ultimately be wealth-enhancing, and therefore not clearly excluded by the social contract
76 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14-21 (1980).
" Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15, 20 (1931).
Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938).
See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITTIrONAL LAw 744 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Con-
stitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward A Public, Public Law, 54 TuL. L. REv. 849 (1980).
' Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 563 (1935); see also City of Pittsburgh v. Alco
Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 373 (1974) ("The claim that a particular tax is so unreasonably high and
unduly burdensome as to deny due process is both familiar and recurring, but the Court has consistent-
ly refused either to undertake the task of passing on the 'reasonableness' of a tax that otherwise is
within the power of Congress or of state legislative authorities, or to hold that a tax is unconstitutional
because it renders a business unprofitable."); Tanque Verde Enterprises v. City of Tucson, 691 P.2d
302, 305-06 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (taxing authorities have unlimited discretion to set the tax rate, de-
spite its effect, and the judiciary will not invalidate the tax "even if the tax may or will result in
restricting or destroying a particular business or occupation").
See Alejandro Portes & D. Frances Ferguson, Comparative Ideologies of Poverty and Equity:
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likely, then, the Court has found no need to exercise a supervisory role
regarding redistribution. Perhaps there are structural limitations, or pro-
cedural roadblocks, to legislative redistribution. Even without structural
limitations, however, there is little reason to think the rich cannot enforce
their own limitations in the political process. Indeed, the interests of the rich
are well-represented; today most legislators are among the wealthiest
individuals in the population.
It is not clear that the rich use these limitations to thwart the interests
of the poor, either. In fact, redistribution creates significant negative effects.
Because output is not supplied perfectly inelastically, at some point lower-
ing the marginal tax rate might significantly increase aggregate wealth."3
The poor might perceive that they are better off taking a smaller slice of a
bigger pie, and might agree to limit tax rates accordingly. Note that in this
case, the poor face no incentive incompatibility problems. No contrary
action in the short run, with the exception of a one-time surprise tax, is
likely to make the poor better off.
B. Discriminatory Property Taxes
Although American courts have been uniformly unsympathetic to
progressive tax challenges, they have scrutinized discriminatory property
taxes more carefully. In this section, we consider special assessments and
general property taxes.
1. Special Assessments
The American courts have a long history of protecting citizens against
the improper use of special assessments and disparate property taxes, and
the courts review them carefully under state and federal due process and
takings clauses. The Takings Clause, incorporated into the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, provides that private property shall not be
taken, except for public use, and with just compensation. 4 While the
Takings Clause, by its terms, applies only to the federal government, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to
Latin America and the United States, in EQurry, INCOME AND POLICY 70, 87-95 (Irving Louis
Horowitz ed., 1977).
2 Robert T. Lampman, Concepts of Equity in the Design of Schemes for Income Redistribution,
in EQUITY. INCOME AND POUCY, supra note 81, at 19, 30-31.
13 Cf EPSEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 1, at 299 ("By increasing the size of the pie, the flat tax
tends to increase the size of each of its slices.").
" See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
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impose the same takings standard on state and local government action."
Moreover, several states have included similar takings provisions in their
constitutions."
American courts have used these constitutional provisions to hold that
discriminatory property taxes can constitute an unconstitutional taking
against the more heavily taxed property owner. For example, in Bonnet v.
State, 7 the New Jersey Superior Court articulated the limits on the state's
power to impose discriminatory taxes under a state constitutional provision
identical to the Takings Clause in the U.S. Constitution: "the imposition of
unfair tax burdens, to the point where they are discriminatory, with the
power to sell the taxed property to collect payment, violates [the takings
clause of the New Jersey Constitution].""8 And while the U.S. Supreme
Court's language seems less protective, the Court has indicated a willing-
ness to use the clauses if discriminatory taxation exceeds permissible
bounds:
[The Due Process Clause] is applicable to a taxing statute only if the act be so
arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the
taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a
different and forbidden power, as, for example, the confiscation of property."
The most common type of taxation struck down under takings and due
process provisions is the special assessment. Special assessments are levied
against a small group of property owners when a public works project will
inure mostly to the benefit of that small group. The legislature could force
the entire community to bear the costs of the project by financing it with
general revenues. Instead, those individuals who receive the benefit of the
project, such as a new sewer main, might pay a separate tax, or special
assessment, to finance the benefit. Courts strike down special assessments
when it appears that (1) a majority of the community is actually forcing a
minority to finance general programs, or (2) an individual taxpayer is being
forced to pay for "improvements" he would never agree to because the cost
assessed to him clearly outweighs the individual taxpayer's benefit. "[T]he
exaction from the owner of private property of the cost of a public im-
provement in substantial excess of the special benefits accruing to him is,
to the extent of such excess, a taking, under the guise of taxation, of private
"5 See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974).
'6 See DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTrITION 280 n.50 (1993). See, e.g.,
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a); CONN. CONST. art. I, § I]; ME. CONST. art. I, § 21; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10;
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 13.
8' 357 A.2d 772 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
Id. at 785.
9 A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934) (citations omitted). See also Brushaber
v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1916) (articulating same limitation on taxing power); Windham
First Taxing Dist. v. Town of Windham, 546 A.2d 226, 234 (Conn. 1988) (same).
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property for public use without compensation.""
Consider, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Village
of Norwood v. Baker.9 In Norwood, the village condemned a strip of land
that ran north to south through the center of Ellen Baker's property to build
a road connecting two existing roads that ran east to west.' A jury award-
ed her $2,000 as the value of the property condemned.93 In the same ordi-
nance that authorized the condemnation, the cost and expense of the
condemnations were to be assessed against the bordering property, regard-
less of the extent to which the bordering property was benefitted by the new
road.94 Because Ms. Baker owned the land to the east and west of the strip
condemned, she was assessed the $2,000 she was originally compensated,
as well as $218, which represented the village's expenses in the previous
condemnation proceedings.95 In effect, the assessment made her worse off
than she would have been had her land been confiscated with no compensa-
tion.' Since the latter option would have been an unconstitutional taking,
the Court ruled that the village's taxation effected a disguised taking which
was also unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.' According to the
Court, if a property owner can establish that he is forced to pay more than
what he receives by reason of a public improvement, then the special
assessment is unconstitutional.98
This outcome is consistent with our predicted social contract. Because
everyone benefits from the development of an efficient road system, forcing
a small subset of the community to pay for that road system is a form of
discriminatory taxation. Ex ante, individuals cannot predict where roads are
likely to be built and what property is likely to be condemned to build
them. Consequently, individuals have symmetric expectations regarding the
taking of their property to build the roads. Precisely because no one can
predict who will bear the burden of a taking ex ante, all individuals can be
expected to be worse off without a guarantee that those burdens will not be
disproportionately assigned.
In other words, without the guarantee, each property owner faces a
Prisoner's Dilemma." All owners are better off if property cannot be taken
' Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 279 (1898). See also Gott v. Norberg, 417 A.2d
1352, 1358-59 (R.I. 1980) (under Rhode Island Constitution's takings clause, the legislature cannot
levy a tax if it provides no benefit or protection in return).
9- 172 U.S. 269 (1898).
92 See id. at 275.
' See id.
See id.
' See id. at 276.
91 See id. at 281-82.
9 See id. at 279, 289, 297.
See id. at 279, 294.
" For a history of the invention of the Prisoner's Dilemma story, see Phillip D. Straffin, Jr., The
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through taxation. However, if an owner expects others to try to take
property through taxation, then the owner has an incentive to be first in line
to reap earlier benefits from a taking."l° Individuals therefore can be
expected to dissipate their net benefits from takings in a race to obtain the
benefits and in an effort to avoid the disparate treatment themselves. The
compensation guarantee prevents the expenditure of these wealth-reducing
coalition costs by eliminating the incentive to use takings to redistribute
wealth. From a contractarian perspective, then, Ms. Baker should be
compensated for the loss of her property.'
In contexts short of outright condemnation, later courts have adopted
the Norwood Court's general principle, that a special assessment is uncon-
stitutional where it transfers wealth to those not taxed. For example, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has articulated three requirements for the validity
of a special assessment, which comport well with our contractarian predic-
tions. First, the land must receive a special benefit from the improvement
being constructed. I°" Second, the assessment must be uniform upon the
same class of property. Third, the assessment must not exceed the
special benefit, measured by the increased market value of the land."° The
first and third requirements together ensure that even those burdened receive
a net benefit from the project. And the second requirement ensures that a
subgroup of those individuals who benefit from the improvement do not
single out other beneficiaries from which to reap redistributive benefits.
Otherwise, the costs associated with competing to be in the tax favored
group, whose membership is unpredictable over time, outweigh any tax
savings to the group that benefits from the discrimination. In other words,
from an ex ante perspective, discrimination among the beneficiaries of the
improvement will not likely make anyone better off, and is therefore
impermissible.
In Ochs v. Town of Hot Sulphur Springs, the town placed a frontage
Prisoner's Dilemma, I U.M.A.P. J. 101 (1980). For a basic treatment of the Prisoner's Dilemma
paradigm, see ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUION OF COOPERATION (1984); CHARLES J. GOETZ,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 8-35 (1984); ERIc RASMUSEN, GAMES AND
INFORMATION 27-30 (1989).
'0o We are assuming here that the property owners each have a positive discount rate. That is, they
prefer to reap benefits earlier and to defer losses until later.
,o Our analysis is very close to Richard Epstein's position regarding all takings. See EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS, supra note 1, at 3-104. However, we believe that the bulk of Epstein's "takings," while
inefficient, likely produce net positive benefits to some groups and will therefore be upheld by the
.,minimalist" courts.
" See Southview Country Club v. City of Inver Grove Heights, 263 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Minn.
1978) (quoting Carlson-Lang Realty Co. v. City of Windom, 240 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Minn. 1976);
Quality Homes, Inc. v. Village of New Brighton, 183 N.W.2d 555, 560 (Minn. 1971)).
103 See Southview, 263 N.W.2d at 387.
,04 See id. at 387-88.
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tax on some of the residents to finance the road and sewer system.'0 5 The
Colorado Supreme Court held that the tax was an unconstitutional taking
because the taxed owners' land was not specially benefitted in any way not
enjoyed by those exempt from the assessment." The court condemned the
tax as "nothing more than a devise or a scheme, unsupported by any per-
missive revenue producing authority, to provide funds for the general
community benefit, and hence violative of the due process of law guaran-
tees of the federal and state constitutions.""''° Of course under our
contractarian model, the property owners that benefit from the improve-
ments can be taxed to help pay for them. But the owners cannot be
discriminatorily taxed to pay for improvements that also inure to the benefit
of those not taxed. Otherwise, over time, the political costs to each citizen
likely outweigh any benefits she expects to receive from discriminatory
special assessments.
Southview Country Club v. City of Inver Grove Heights"°s provides
another example of impermissible assessments. The Minnesota Supreme
Court held that a special assessment levied on a country club for a water
main improvement and sewer main extension constituted an unconstitutional
taking."9 The country club owned two adjacent parcels on which the tax
was assessed."' One parcel was undeveloped, and even if it were devel-
oped to the maximum extent permitted by the zoning laws, the present
water and sewer main would serve all its needs."' The other parcel was
an integral part of the club's golf course, and placing lines where the city
planned would destroy thirteen of the eighteen holes on the course." 2 The
court concluded that the lines would confer no special benefits on the club,
and, as a consequence, the assessment was unconstitutional." 3
Here, too, our contractarian model predicts that even a minimally
activist court would strike down this assessment. Other property owners
might receive great benefits from sewer and water mains, but they are not
entitled to single out property that receives no benefit to help pay for those
improvements, especially when only a few property owners are required to
" 407 P.2d 677, 678 (Colo. 1965) (en banc).
'o See id. at 680. According to the Ochs court, "Special benefits which will sustain a special
assessment must be immediate, and of such a character that they can be seen and traced. Remote or
contingent benefits enjoyed by the general public will not sustain a special assessment" Id. (quoting
Pomroy v. Board of Pub. Waterworks, 136 P. 78, 81 (Colo. 1913)).
107 id.
'0 263 N.W.2d 385.
'o See id. at 387-89.
11 See id. at 386-87.
. See id. at 388.
112 See id.
"' See id. at 388-89. See also Anderson v. Town of Litchfield, 492 A.2d 210, 213 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1985) (striking down sewer assessment that exceeded benefit to landowner as unconstitutional
taking).
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bear the entire costs of the project. Again, it is not the discrimination itself
but rather the instability of the coalitions creating the discrimination that
makes the assessment impermissible. This year neighbor A is burdened,
next year neighbor B, then C, and so on. In the end, no one expects to be
made better off by the discrimination, but everyone spends resources
competing to avoid the discriminatory tax each year. The restriction ensures
that at least some coalition benefits from special assessments over time.
It may appear, however, that this tax is really a wealth tax-if only the
rich can afford to join country clubs and the club passes its costs on to the
members, why is this tax not permissibly redistributive under our predicted
social contract? The key lies in the fact that a generally applied progressive
tax can produce the same result with much lower social cost. Even assum-
ing that all country club members are rich, the members may be primarily
democrats, or republicans, or doctors, or lawyers. Once a small subset of
the wealthy may be singled out for discriminatory taxation, the rich will
incur coalition costs to avoid the subset that suffers the disparate treatment.
Rich individuals cannot tell ex ante when they will be part of the benefitted
or burdened groups. Presumably they would prefer uniform progressive
taxation to random taxation that singles out members of the rich population
who are not part of the existing majority coalition. At least then they will
not compete to avoid the more heavily taxed group; after all, competition
among rich groups will likely dissipate any gains to random discrimination
among those wealthy groups. The poor will not likely object to prohibiting
this seemingly random discrimination, for presumably they do not care
which rich people pay for their transfers. Consequently, where the rich have
symmetric expectations regarding the outcome of taxes that discriminate
among them, a rule forbidding nonuniform redistribution from wealthy to
poor might likely result." 4
2. General Property Taxes
Courts scrutinize discrimination in general property taxes as well,
although the costs of perfect enforcement are prohibitive. Here, discrimina-
tory taxes are generally challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the
"' As we note in Part II.C, some wealthy groups or industries might pay higher taxes because the
supply or demand for their productive activities is relatively inelastic. We sharply distinguish those
forms of taxation because majority coalitions typically prefer to raise revenues by taxing those goods
and services that least distort production and consumption choices. In contrast, special assessments tend
to discriminate against local individuals or groups, without regard to the stability of the coalitions that
form to discriminate. Or, in other words, they may single out some, but not all, taxpayers with rela-
tively inelastic supply functions, thereby creating incentives for those individuals to compete to avoid
the taxes. In this sense, the discrimination is purely political, and more likely leads to the complete
dissipation of any benefits than does more general discrimination based on persistent economic factors.
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U.S. Constitution or a uniform taxation provision in a state constitution.'"
The standard applied across jurisdictions is similar regardless of the
provision used. When property is assessed for general tax purposes, the
state may not assess two substantially identical properties at substantially
different amounts. "Intentional and systematic undervaluation by assessors
of other taxable property in the same class violates the constitutional right
of a person taxed upon the full value of his property."" 6
For example, in Penn Phillips Lands, Inc. v. State Tax Commis-
sion,17 the Supreme Court of Oregon struck down a county assessor's ap-
praisal of a taxpayer's land at $60 per acre when neighboring properties
"indistinguishable in soil, vegetation, topography, access to roads, and every
other visible particular""' were assessed at $5 per acre."9 Although the
taxpayer admitted his property was worth at least as much as the value
assessed,"2 the court found that the discriminatory tax burden violated
both the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution and the uniform
taxation provision of the state constitution.'' To the court, "[t]he taxing
authorities may not single out one taxpayer for discriminatory, or selective,
enforcement of a tax law that should apply equally to all similarly situated
taxpayers."'" To us, "similarly situated" means individuals with symmet-
ric expected outcomes. The assessor picked this particular property owner
for discriminatory treatment that presumably benefits other property owners.
Because ex ante almost all property owners are equally likely to be chosen
for disparate treatment, we think the social contract would prohibit this
"' See, e.g., Gilman v. City of Sheboygan, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 510, 514-17 (1862) (Wisconsin and
Ohio Constitutions both provide that all property, real or personal, that is taxable, must be taxed
uniformly); Idaho Tel. Co. v. Baird, 423 P.2d 337, 341-42 (Idaho 1967) (discussing Idaho, New
Hampshire, California, Illinois, Missouri, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Delaware uniform taxation
provisions); Prisk v. City of Poulsbo, 732 P.2d 1013, 1020 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (Washington
Constitution provides that "[aill taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property ... and shall
be levied and collected for public purposes only"); Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. County Court, 62
S.E.2d 801, 805 (W. Va. 1950) (West Virginia Constitution provides that taxation must be equal and
uniform throughout the state, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to
its value to be ascertained as directed by law), overruled in part by In re Kanawha Valley Bank, 109
S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1959).
16 State Dep't of Assessments and Taxation v. Clark, 380 A.2d 28, 41 (Md. 1977); see also Sioux
City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441,445 (1923) ("[1]ntentional systematic undervaluation
by state officials of other taxable property in the same class contravenes the constitutional right of one
taxed upon the full value of his property.") (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Township,
247 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1918)); In re Kanawha Valley Bank, 109 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1959) (systematic
assessment of money and shares of bank stock at a higher percentage of their value than that at which
other species of property are assessed violates West Virginia Constitution).
430 P.2d 349 (Or. 1967) (en banc).
'" Id. at 351.
"9 See id. at 350-52.
1i See id. at 350.
. See id. at 351-52.
' Id. at 352.
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discrimination.
However, the courts are careful not to take too active a role enforcing
the social contract. Mere judgment errors by assessors will not support a
claim of discrimination. " "There must be something which in effect
amounts to an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical
uniformity."'24 Because the courts have limited resources, they recognize
that small, inadvertent, and short-term discrepancies in assessments must go
unchecked. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Oregon has said that an underas-
sessment of one or two properties in a taxing district cannot be challenged
by those who pay more, I" given the slight individual harm suffered by
the large number of taxpayers more heavily burdened.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently has also distinguished between
property tax discrimination against one or two individuals, and group
discrimination which likely results from stable coalition formation. In Nor-
dlinger v. Hahn," the Court rejected an Equal Protection Clause chal-
lenge to California's well-known "Proposition 13." In response to rapidly
rising real property values and taxes, the citizens of California, through a
statewide ballot initiative, placed caps on both assessed values and tax
rates." Tax rates were prohibited from rising more than one percent each
year, and assessed values of real property could increase no more than two
percent each year, except in cases of improvements or changes in owner-
ship." The tax caused dramatic disparities in taxes paid by persons
owning similar pieces of property.'" Those who had purchased their
property before Proposition 13 paid, in some cases, several times less per
year than those who purchased comparable property after Proposition
13.13°
The incidence of the discriminatory tax here is quite difficult to
ascertain. Although there are several possibilities, we mention the two most
obvious. First, it might transfer wealth generally from income earners to
property owners. In the first year after Proposition 13 took effect, owners
enjoyed a property tax cut of seven billion dollars.'13' Presumably, some of
this cut was recouped by a tax on income or other sources of wealth.
3 Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989); Sunday Lake
Iron Co. v. Wakefield Township, 247 U.S. 350, 353 (1918); Citizens' Comm. for Fair Property
Taxation v. Warner, 254 P.2d 1005, 1010 (Colo. 1953); State Dep't of Assessments and Taxation v.
Clark, 380 A.2d 28, 41 (Md. 1977).
124 Clark, 380 A.2d at 41-42.
'n Penn Phillips Lands, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 430 P.2d 349, 351 (Or. 1967) (en banc).
505 U.S. 1 (1992).
' See id. at 4.
' See id. at 5.
'29 See id. at 6.
' See id. at 6-7.
' See id. at 5.
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Second, Proposition 13 may also transfer wealth from property sellers to
property retainers. Those who retain their property receive a tax deferral,
which might reduce their aggregate tax bills relative to what they would
have been without Proposition 13. If so, the extra burden is borne at least
in part by property sellers. Presumably, the sellers receive less for their
property than they otherwise would if the purchasers must pay more in
taxes than they would have without Proposition 13.
The point is that some groups, such as property owners and property
retainers, can expect to benefit on net from assessed-value discrimination.
Unlike discrimination against individuals, where expectations are symmetric
and everyone loses on net because they spend resources trying to avoid the
discrimination, Proposition 13 produces asymmetric expectations likely to
lead to a stable majority coalition. Individual beneficiaries of Proposition 13
do not share equally in the transfers, but here the non-cash nature of the
transfer prevents them from dissipating the proceeds. Thus, net beneficiaries
of Proposition 13 would not agree to its prohibition ex ante. In this sense,
the tax is "nonarbitrary."
Nordlinger provides evidence that the Court does, in fact, scrutinize
discriminatory taxes based on the symmetry of expected outcomes. In
upholding Proposition 13, the Court attempted to distinguish Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission,132 decided three years earlier.
In Allegheny, the Court struck down a county assessor's policy effectively
identical to Proposition 13. The assessor increased property valuations
minimally each year unless the property was sold, in which case the as-
sessment increased to the sale price of the property."3 As with Proposition
13, those who bought property after the assessor instituted her policy paid
much higher taxes than those who purchased their property before the poli-
cy. 35 The assessor's policy, like Proposition 13, produced asymmetries in
expected payoffs.
How can Nordlinger be distinguished from Allegheny?"3 The policy
in Allegheny resulted from an administrative action whereas Proposition 13
was a state ballot initiative. True, the Court in Nordlinger expressly rejected
lesser Equal Protection Clause protections against legislative mandates than
against administrative actions. 37 But the critical distinction lies between
ballot initiatives and other means of redistribution. Precisely because of the
difficulty of determining who ultimately bears the burden of the tax scheme,
3 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
m See id. at 338.
"3 See id. at 338-39.
135 See id.
,3' Justice Thomas, in concurrence, Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 18, and Justice Stevens, in dissent, id.
at 31-32, found the two cases indistinguishable.
'"7 See id. at 16 n.8.
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the Court is unable to determine what is motivating administrative (or
legislative) action. The county assessor may have adopted his policy in
order to benefit his grandmother at the expense of others. The next adminis-
trator might adopt a new policy designed to benefit his friends, and so on.
In other words, there is much less evidence that the policy is supported by
a stable coalition when it is promulgated by an administrator. At the same
time, the voters presumably are better situated to determine whether they
stand to benefit on net from Proposition 13 over time. If they nevertheless
support the Proposition, the Court defers to the citizens' determination that
the policy produces asymmetric benefits. Legislation presumably stands
somewhere between administrative policy and ballot initiatives. Legislation
typically receives stronger deference than administrative policy and is
upheld unless the Court is convinced that it produces symmetric expecta-
tions. Absent strong evidence to the contrary, a coalition that produces leg-
islation is likely to be stable over time. On the other hand, individual ad-
ministrators come and go. At the other extreme lies the voters themselves,
a population whose sentiments are likely to remain stable for much longer
than the individuals in government who represent the competing groups. 3
C. Other Discriminatory Taxation
1. Inter Versus Intra-group Discrimination
Tax classifications are made in other contexts as well. One common
classification is to place a tax on all businesses in a particular industry but
exempt businesses in other industries. The Supreme Court has fairly consis-
tently upheld these industry taxes.'39
"I See BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIc 383-90 (1992)
(concluding, through extensive survey data, that citizens' policy preferences are stable, rational, and
sophisticated).
'3 See, e.g., Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959) ("The State may
impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions and may vary the rate of excise
upon various products. It is not required to resort to close distinctions or to maintain a precise,
scientific uniformity with reference to composition, use or value."); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223
U.S. 59, 62 (1912) ("A state does not deny the equal protection of the laws merely by adjusting its
revenue laws and taxing system in such a way as to favor certain industries or forms of industry."); see
also Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937) (upholding Alabama Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act, which exempted various categories of employers); A. Magnano Co. v. Hamil-
ton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934) (Washington state tax on oleomargarine but not on butter); Gundling v. City
of Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900) (license fee for sale of cigarettes); Royall v. Virginia, 116 U.S. 572
(1886) (license fees for attorneys); Kentucky R.R. Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321 (1885) (real estate tax on
railroads, but not on other forms of real estate and business); McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37 (1877)
(mem.) (license fee on retail merchants with higher amounts charged to those selling liquor and to
certain types of merchants); Lake Lanier Theatres v. Hall County, 189 S.E.2d 439 (Ga. 1972) (business
license tax imposed on places of amusement charging an admission fee, but not on those not charging
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Here is a classic example of interest group politics with asymmetric
expectations. Individuals know what professions they are likely to pursue,
and those who can organize effectively to gain transfers without dissipating
rents would not agree to a constitutional prohibition against their efforts.
Let us suppose, for simplicity, that everyone in America belonged to one of
three professions: bankers, grocers or farmers. If grocers and farmers can
organize more easily to transfer wealth from bankers, then an occupational
tax on bankers results from a stable coalition. Perhaps grocers and farmers
share natural affinities not found with bankers. Or, the differing elasticities
of supply and demand in the three industries might establish that the dead-
weight costs associated with burdening the bankers are lower than they
would be if grocers or farmers were taxed instead. If so, grocers and
farmers could receive greater net benefits from taxing the bankers than any
group could obtain from taxing the grocers or farmers. Occupational taxes
thus clearly enable asymmetric expectations, and those who expect to
benefit from them would not agree to prohibit them. As with our earlier
examples, the Court declines to strike down discriminatory taxes unless they
would be unanimously condemned ex ante.
Discriminatory taxes placed on only a subset of those in a particular
industry or interest group become more problematic. Sometimes the
Supreme Court upholds the discriminatory taxes, while at other times the
taxes are struck down. The disparate treatment often can be explained by
"rough-guessing" the symmetry of expected outcomes. In Bradley v. City of
Richmond,"4 for example, a city ordinance prohibited persons from pursu-
ing certain businesses and occupations without paying a special license
tax.141 Those businesses and occupations were divided into thirteen
classes, and each class was required to pay a different license tax ranging
from $10 to $800.142 The Court rejected an Equal Protection Clause
challenge to the tax as applied to private bankers. 43 The bankers had been
divided into two different classes.'" Those who lent money at high rates
upon sales and household furniture were required to pay a higher license fee
an admission fee).
We focus our attention on discriminatory taxation, and confine our analysis to taxation primarily
intended to raise revenues, excluding taxation motivated by regulatory concerns. However, regulatory
taxes on particular industries clearly can be viewed as taxes for which expectations are asymmetric.
See, e.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (tax on wagers), overruled in part by Marchetti
v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950) (tax on marijuana);
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937) (tax on firearms); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S.
86 (1919) (tax on narcotics); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904) (tax on colored oleomarga-
rine).
'40 227 U.S. 477 (1913).
i41 See id. at 480.
142 See id.
, See id. at 482-84.
See id. at 484.
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than those who made commercial loans.'45 While both groups were en-
gaged in the same industry-private banking-the two groups likely
provided very different services to two very different markets. If so, the rel-
ative natural affinities within each subset were likely large enough so that
the higher-taxed bankers would have difficulty luring some of the lower-
taxed bankers into a coalition to readjust the tax burden to fall more heavily
on some other group of private bankers. In this sense the expectations of
the two groups of bankers are asymmetric, and ex ante the bankers would
not agree unanimously to prohibit the discrimination between the banks.
The Court upheld the tax."4
Similarly, in Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago,47 the Su-
preme Court upheld a city ordinance requiring the payment of license fees
by "places of amusement."'" The license fee for transfers was graded ac-
cording to the price of admission, exclusive of box seats. The fee
ranged from $200 to $1,000, and rose with the price of admission.'" As
in Bradley, it seems reasonable that a theatre charging fifteen cents is pro-
viding a very different product and serving a distinctly different market than
a theatre charging one dollar or more. If so, coalitions within the theatre
industry may well be stable, and the tax not prohibited.'
Contrast these two cases with a third, Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v.
Coleman.' The state of Kentucky imposed a tax on the recording of
mortgages equal to twenty cents for each $100 of value secured, but
exempted mortgages that matured within five years.' Here, the Court
struck down the discrimination." While states could charge a fee for the
recording service, charging disparate fees in the manner chosen by Ken-
tucky was arbitrary.55 The expectations here seem symmetric. Recorders
with three-year mortgages are not likely to be meaningfully different from
recorders with eight-year mortgages, or at least the Court discovered no
significant differences. The discrimination might as well have been on the
basis of the recorder's eye color. In both cases, the group whose fees are
145 See id.
' See id. at 482-86.
' 228 U.S. 61 (1913).
Id. at 61, 69-70.
'4 See id. at 61.
'5' See id. at 61-62.
's, For other examples of intra-industry taxes for which the expectations are asymmetric, see Ohio
Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146 (1930) (tax on oils classified by Baume gravity upheld; classification
merely distinguished lubrication oils from gasoline); American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S.
89 (1900) (upholding licensing tax imposed on manufacturers engaged in business of refining sugar,
but exempting those who refine products of their own plantations).
152 277 U.S. 32 (1928).
'3 See id. at 35.
'5 See id. at 40-41.
's See id. at 38-39.
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subsidized share no affinities that make the coalition stable. Those who pay
a higher tax are likely to compete for some of the members of the benefit-
ted group by proposing a redrafting of the recording tax. And those who
pay the lower tax will incur costs trying to retain a favorable classification.
On net, none of the recorders can expect to be better off, and permitted
discrimination induces coalition costs that likely leave everyone worse off.
The recorders would therefore agree to prohibit this discrimination, and the
Court stepped in to enforce the social contract.
Often the presence of asymmetries within a particular industry are not
so clear. Here the Court seems reluctant to interfere, apparently preferring
to risk large-scale dead-weight costs over interfering with interest-group
politics. In this sense, then, the courts can be said to take a "super-minimal-
ist" approach to discriminatory taxes. An example of the super-minimalist
approach is Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania"5 and its aftermath. In
Quaker City, the Court initially struck down a tax imposed on corporate-
owned cab companies, reasoning that the discrimination between these
companies and unincorporated cab owners was "not justified by any
difference in the source of the receipts or in the situation or character of the
property employed."'57 After Quaker City was questionably distinguished
in several subsequent opinions,'58 however, the Court finally overturned it
forty-five years later in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., stating:
We could strike down this tax as discriminatory only if we substituted our
judgment on the facts of which we can be only dimly aware for a legislative
judgment that reflects a vivid reaction to pressing fiscal problems. Quaker City
Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania is only a relic of a bygone era. We cannot follow it
and stay within the narrow confines of judicial review, which is an important
part of our constitutional tradition.'59
Are cab owner expectations symmetric or asymmetric in this context?
It is hard to say without more information about the differences in business
volumes, services, practices and methods. Notice the Court's implicit
change in burden of proof between Quaker City and Lehnhausen. Prior to
President Roosevelt's famous Court-packing plan, the Supreme Court
overturned non-equalizing taxes only when individuals' expectations were
symmetric, but the Court sometimes assumed symmetric expectations in the
absence of contrary evidence. More recently, the Court has apparently re-
versed its presumption, as illustrated in the block quote above, and now
assumes expectations are asymmetric without contrary proof.
"6 277 U.S. 389 (1928), overruled by Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356
(1973).
'I Id. at 402.
'~' See Lehnhausen, 410 U.S. at 360-65 (discussing gradual demise of Quaker City holding).
'9 Id. at 365.
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2. The Problem of Locating Discrimination
Occasionally a tax that looks discriminatory on its face is actually
intended to remove a disparity that exists someplace else. An example is In
re Champion International Corp.,"W where the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina upheld a county ad valorem tax placed on Champion's use of
Hofmann Forest, which was owned by the state as a commercial timber
farm. The North Carolina Constitution required "that taxation be done in a
just and equitable manner and that no class of property be taxed except by
uniform rule and that every classification be made by general law.'' The
state legislature had authorized the taxation of Champion's use of the forest
by passing a statute which provided:
When any cropland or forestland owned by the United States, the State, a
county or a municipal corporation is leased, loaned or otherwise made available
to and used by a person... in connection with a business conducted for profit,
the lessee or user of the property is subject to taxation to the same extent as if
the lessee or user owned the property.
62
The court upheld the statute despite Champion's claim that it was the sole
taxpayer singled out for discrimination because the statute's stated purpose
was "to eliminate the competitive advantage accruing to profit-making
enterprises from the use of the tax-exempt property."'63 Before the statute,
Champion's tax burden was lower than other similarly situated companies
because the state constitution forbade taxing state, county or municipally
owned property." While other companies paid property taxes to the
county, Champion was exempted because it leased the forest from the state
rather than owning it. The classification in the challenged statute in effect
removed this exemption so that the county could achieve parity."6 With-
out discrimination in the total tax treatment of these competitors, the
question of symmetries becomes irrelevant.
In another case, Walters v. City of St. Louis,'" the Supreme Court
upheld a city ordinance that taxed gross salaries and wages of employed
"0 329 S.E.2d 691, 694-95 (N.C. CL App. 1985).
162 Id. at 694.
16 Id. at 692.
- id. at 693.
'6, See id.
" See also W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n, 180 U.S. 452
(1901). In Cargill, the Court upheld a tax on warehouses situated on the right-of-way of a railroad
while exempting warehouses not so situated but doing exactly the same business. See id. at 468-69. By
subsidizing the building of the railroad, the government had conferred a benefit on the warehouses
located along the right-of-way. The state in this case taxes those warehouses in an effort to offset the
competitive advantage it gave to those warehouses.
'66 347 U.S. 231 (1954).
[Vol. 6:4
HeinOnline  -- 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 912 1997-1998
DISCRIMINATORY TAXES
persons but only the net profits of self-employed persons. 7 Because no
taxes had yet been collected, the Court considered only whether the
disparate treatment was unconstitutional on its face.' The Court's conclu-
sion is not surprising, given that any disparate treatment between the two
groups would likely be small, since wage earners would probably incur few
expenses that could be deducted by self-employed persons but not them-
selves. Indeed, deductions to self-employed persons for the necessary costs
of doing business seemed primarily motivated to achieve parity, not dis-
parity, between the two groups. And, as mentioned earlier, perfectly
monitoring small-scale discrimination is impossible for the courts. Thus,
regardless of whether symmetric expectations exist, the Court upholds the
tax.
69
The argument that a tax effects parity or is a special assessment for the
use of government-provided goods is dangerous, however. The same
argument was used by the Supreme Court in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
Auto Parts Co.7 to uphold a state ad valorem tax on personal property of
corporations. Individuals and noncorporate businesses were exempt from the
taX.' 7' The Court treated the distinction as one of paying for corporate
benefits:
[T]he tax is laid upon the privileges which exist in conducting business with
the advantages which inhere in the corporate capacity of those taxed, and
which are not enjoyed by private firms or individuals. These advantages are
obvious, and have led to the formation of such companies in nearly all
branches of trade. The continuity of the business.... the transfer of property
interests by the disposition of shares of stock, the advantages of business
controlled and managed by corporate directors, the general absence of indi-
vidual liability, these and other things inhere in the advantages of business thus
conducted, which do not exist when the same business is conducted by private
individuals or partnerships.'
First, the tax on corporations does not seem to remove any concrete
disparity, as was the case for Champion. Once Champion had leased the
government lands, others were excluded from doing the same. In contrast,
no business entity is excluded from using the corporate form just because
others have done so. Because other businesses can adopt the corporate form
to gain the same benefits as corporations, it seems only reasonable to as-
sume the costs outweigh the benefits for unincorporated entities. Second,
while the state could place a special assessment on benefits it provides to
"6 See id. at 236-37.
'6 See id. at 232-33.
.. See id. at 236-37.
j' 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
17 See id. at 357.
72 Id. at 362 (quoting Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 161-62 (1911)).
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corporations, those corporations are already subject to other forms of
taxation which may adequately cover the "costs" to society, assuming there
are any, to allowing them to choose the corporate form. Because corpora-
tions are generally taxed more heavily even without the ad valorem tax im-
posed in Lehnhausen, it seems unlikely the tax is justified on special
assessment grounds.
That does not necessarily mean that the Supreme Court has failed to
enforce a minimalist social contract, however. Shareholders are the primary
losers in this discriminatory tax. If there are asymmetric expectations
between shareholders and nonshareholders, then nonshareholders would not
agree to prohibit the tax.
IV. THE MINIMALIST ROLE OF THE COURTS
Why have courts refused to take a more active role in scrutinizing
discriminatory taxes? After all, rent seeking through taxation entails
significant dead-weight costs. And, from a fairness perspective, why should
some groups be permitted to systematically reap benefits at the expense of
others? If anything, fairness norms should lead the courts to take the
position converse to the one we observe. That is, using governmental
powers to systematically discriminate seems much more oppressive and
unjust than adopting tax treatments that shift the benefits and burdens across
varying groups over time. Whatever our normative views of rent seeking,
ultimately the American courts are institutionally incapable of checking
legislative coalitions.
The critical point here is that where expectations are asymmetric, the
coalition that generated the discriminatory tax is stable. Recall from our
earlier discussion that stable coalitions entail cost advantages that make
wealth transfers welfare-enhancing to their members over time. Usually
natural affinities make it difficult for other groups to break down member-
ship in the individual groups that tend to be included in the majority
coalition. If the group can successfully prevent exit and limit those who
share the benefits of the transfers, then the group will likely prove to be a
powerful political force in the future as well. When judges are not insulated
from majority whim, as is the case in many states, then the same political
forces that create discriminatory taxes pressure the judges to uphold
them.173 Even in the federal system, where judges are insulated from
Congress by guaranteed salaries and life tenure, judicial confirmations and
congressional control of the courts' budgets may themselves constrain wide-
'7 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting importance of independent judiciary
for confining legislative branch).
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spread rejection of interest group legislation. Indeed, the very fact that the
Supreme Court can decide only a few cases each year may ensure a non-
activist judiciary because once the Court engages in activism to control the
legislature, it loses control over the lower courts. Extremely limited review
prevents an activist Court from doing any more than generating broad
guidelines for the lower courts. And once the lower courts are unleashed,
the Supreme Court is incapable of closely monitoring their activism. In the
end, the Supreme Court justices may prefer a somewhat unfettered legisla-
ture, which is at least limited by popular opinion, to an uncontrolled federal
judiciary.
Moreover, while perfect judicial independence might enable the courts
to scrutinize discriminatory taxes more carefully, the stable nature of the
coalitions that produce wealth transfers renders efforts to check them futile.
If the courts strike down a discriminatory tax generated by a stable coali-
tion, then that stable coalition will likely respond by generating the same
transfer in another more complicated and less efficient form. For example,
the coalition might enact a complicated regulatory scheme to achieve the
transfer.174 As the transfer becomes more complicated, the courts become
less able to identify the redistributive nature of the regulation. And the more
complicated the regulatory scheme, the greater the dead weight costs as-
sociated with the transfer. To be sure, the greater the costs imposed on
special interest groups seeking legislative benefits, the less rent seeking we
will observe on the margin. But those that succeed may well entail much
higher dead-weight costs on the margin than those the courts prevent. More-
over, active courts would be required to invest significant effort reviewing
wealth transfers, and it is not clear they possess the resources to mount a
fight, especially when they lack the information necessary to ensure success.
The Court itself has expressed concern over locating the parties that end up
bearing the burdens of taxation: "courts as institutions are poorly equipped
to evaluate with precision the relative burdens of various methods of
taxation. The complexities of factual economic proof always present a
certain potential for error, and courts have little familiarity with the process
of evaluating the relative economic burden of taxes."'75 Given their limit-
ed capacities to effectively check stable coalitions, the courts permit the tax
transfers to minimize social losses.
Indeed, it should come as no surprise that courts lack either the
'7' Regulators tend to choose the most efficient forms of redistribution available. See Becker,
Comment, supra note 42, at 247. If these efficient redistributions are "detected" and struck down by
the courts, then the legislators might naturally choose more elaborate and hence less efficient means to
achieve the transfers, while simultaneously masking their special interest nature. Cf Nelson, supra note
42, at 326 (obvious explanation for non-cash transfers is to hide transfers from majority).
"' Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 589 (1983)
(footnote omitted).
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independence, or the resources, or both, to fight stable coalitions. Law and
economics scholars often make normative arguments to the effect that
courts should strike down inefficient legislative bargains. 176 But it is a
logical fallacy to view the courts as an external, or exogenous, solution to
an inferior contractarian equilibrium. After all, the very coalitions that suc-
ceed in generating wealth transfers have a large stake in ensuring that the
courts preserve their benefits. Properly viewed, then, the courts are institu-
tions endogenous to our rent seeking structure and cannot realistically be
expected to succeed in thwarting political agendas in any wide-scale sense.
Instead, without a specific constitutional prohibition, courts apparently are
functionally confined to resolving only the Prisoner's Dilemma-type
problem, where everyone agrees ex ante that he would be better off with a
prohibition against a transfer.
We do not mean to suggest that the courts have eschewed all efforts to
minimize the costs of rent seeking. In fact, the courts sometimes help
minimize the dead-weight costs that stable coalitions generate by discrimi-
nating between the forms of tax transfers used by political groups. One
example is the Supreme Court's Equal Protection Clause scrutiny of chain
store taxes in the 1930s.1' Several states had enacted tax schemes under
which retail businesses were taxed progressively according to the number of
stores under common ownership, management, or supervision.' The tax
presumably was a response by local individual retailers threatened by the
growth of higher volume, more cost-effective chain stores. In effect, the tax
transferred wealth from the chain stores to the local retailers by raising
costs to the chain stores and thereby making it easier for the local retailers
to compete with the chains. In a series of cases, the Court upheld the
schemes.'79 During the same period, however, the Court struck down,
without discussion, Iowa's efforts to achieve the same transfer with a gross
sales tax on the chain stores 8
'76 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 1, at 3-3 1; BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES
AND THE CONSTITTMON 265-303 (1980). But see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify
More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991) (arguing that law and economics focus on
defects of legislative processes ignores defects in judicial decision making).
'" See Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937); Valentine v. Great All. &
Pac. Tea Co., 299 U.S. 32 (1936) (per curiam); Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87 (1935); Louis K.
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933); State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931).
" See, e.g., Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412; Fox, 294 U.S. 87; Lee, 288 U.S. 517; Jackson, 283 U.S.
527.
79 See Grosjean, 301 U.S. at 419; Fox, 294 U.S. at 87; Lee, 288 U.S. at 517; Jackson, 283 U.S.
at 542.
" See Valentine, 299 U.S. at 33.
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Why the distinction? Presumably, the chains generate scale efficiencies
that enable them to earn profits that the local retailers do not earn. If a tax
on the number of stores is not so large that it induces actual store
closings, 8' then the tax affects neither supply nor price. As long as the
stores remain open, the retailers have an incentive to provide the same
services and goods they would provide without the tax. While creating the
tax entailed some dead-weight costs, the tax itself merely redistributes
wealth from the chains. In contrast, a tax on gross sales creates dead-weight
losses in addition to the costs of generating the legislation. As is well
known in public finance, an excise-type tax reduces the output of the taxed
activity, which in turn reduces both consumer and producer surplus.' The
Court may not have been able to effectively prevent the transfers, but it en-
sured that the transfers took the relatively efficient form. 3
By definition, enhancing the efficiency of transfers eliminates costs
associated with the transfers themselves. However, to the extent that only a
minority benefits from a wealth transfer, the more efficient the transfer, the
more durable it becomes. Costly transfers may generate opposition to them;
indeed, the Dougan and Snyder theory of coalition formation incorporates
the Chicago School public choice insight that less efficient rent seeking is
more likely to be defeated in the political arena."' When the Court en-
sures more efficient forms of rent seeking, it may end up expanding the life
of the transfer itself. One might wonder, then, whether this "second order"
efficiency does not make us all worse off in the end.
The timing of the chain store tax cases is critical to our conclusion that
individuals are better off when the Court strikes down the gross sales tax.
The Court had already decided several chain store tax cases, so it knew that
stable coalitions within the states tended to include local retailers striving
for protection. The Court had no reason to believe that the political land-
scape in Iowa was any different. Even if the gross sales tax proved to be
sufficiently costly that Iowa eventually abandoned it, local retailers would
likely substitute the tax for the more efficient per store tax. In the end, one
tax or the other would likely persist. And by striking down the gross sales
"' The taxes were relatively small, generally in the range of $10 to $250 per store. See Grosjean,
301 U.S. at 418 ($15-$200 per store); Fox, 294 U.S. at 88 ($2-$250 per store); Lee, 288 U.S. at 529
($5-$50 per store); Jackson, 283 U.S. at 531-32 ($3-$25 per store).
" See generally BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 40.
's3 The courts have adopted the role of preserving "second best" efficiency in a myriad of other
contexts as well. See, e.g., Richard S. Murphy & Erin A. O'Hara, Mistake of Federal Criminal Law:
A Study of Coalitions and Costly Information, 5 Sup. Cr. ECON. REV. 217 (1997) (concluding that
federal courts use criminal mistake of law doctrine to enhance the strength and efficiency of legislative
bargains); Erin A. O'Hara, Contractual Choice of Law: A Libertarian Puzzle (unpublished manuscript
on file with authors) (concluding that contractual choice of law enhances the likelihood of legislative
bargains by diminishing their dead-weight costs).
'" See Becker, Theory of Competition, supra note 36, at 20.
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tax, the Court helped eliminate the interim costs associated with the less
efficient gross sales tax.
CONCLUSION
What role should courts serve regarding wealth redistribution through
tax provisions? Perhaps they should base decisions on efficiency grounds,
protecting society from the transactions costs and other wealth reductions
associated with rent seeking. Perhaps they should protect those chosen to
bear the burden of discriminatory treatment regardless of social costs, out
of fairness concerns for equal treatment. At a minimum, however, the courts
should prohibit taxes that would be unanimously condemned ex ante. In this
Article, we show, primarily with cases treating progressive taxation,
discriminatory property taxes, and taxes on businesses, that the courts have
chosen only this third minimalist function.
In a society where wealth is unequally endowed, the proportion of rich
to poor individuals sufficiently large, and the coalition costs of wealth
transfers relatively modest, a unanimous social contract can be formed that
permits wealth redistribution toward equality, although that redistribution
may be limited by social norm or formal constitution. American courts, in
accordance with our predicted social contract, have rather consistently re-
jected constitutional challenges to progressive taxation.
What about other taxes? Our model, building on Dougan and Snyder,
predicts that unanimous agreement favoring prohibition is likely only for
non-equalizing wealth distribution with symmetric expectations regarding
the proceeds. Under these conditions, no one expects to be better off over
time from rent seeking, and the transactions and other costs associated with
attempting the transfers will make everyone worse off in expected value
terms. If everyone is made worse off with a particular transfer game, then
the benefits of the social contract are eroded. Without the prohibition, the
society risks being thrown back into anarchy, an inferior state to that under
a social contract that prohibits transfers with symmetric expectations. In
those contexts where we find expectations are symmetric, as with dis-
criminatory property taxation against individuals and small groups, for
example, the courts have served a vital role as guardians of the social
contract. While the courts are limited by enforcement costs, they help
prevent anarchic unraveling by supervising the most egregious cases of non-
equalizing wealth transfers.
However, where expectations are sufficiently asymmetric because some
individuals expect that they are more likely to be members of coalitions
reaping positive net benefits from discriminatory taxes, those individuals
who expect to benefit from the transfers will not agree to a prohibition. The
transfers may be both inefficient and unfair, but the courts apparently are
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reluctant to trump legislative bargains without a strong sense of unanimous
agreement to prohibit them ex ante. We think the key lies in the courts'
recognized inability to check stable coalitions.
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